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Abstract 
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of multi-product firms and analyzes their behavior during trade 
liberalization. Firm productivity in a given product is modeled as a combination of firm-level “ability” and firm-
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1. Introduction
Firms producing multiple products dominate domestic production and international
trade. In the United States, firms manufacturing more than one product account for
more than 90 percent of total manufacturing shipments, while firms that export multiple
products represent more than 95 percent of total exports.1 Despite the overwhelming
empirical importance of multi-product firms, comparatively little theoretical research
examines how firms’ product scope (i.e., the number of goods produced or exported) is
determined or how it is influenced by globalization.
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of international trade in which firms
that are heterogeneous in both firm-specific ability and firm-product-specific expertise
choose endogenous ranges of products to manufacture and sell abroad. The model is
motivated by a series of stylized facts about multi-product firms that have emerged
recently, most notably a positive correlation between the number of products firms
produce and their output per product. The framework captures these stylized facts and
returns a number of novel theoretical implications that can be taken to the data.
A key prediction of the model is that trade liberalization induces adjustments along
firms’ extensive (number of goods) and intensive (sales per product) margins as well
as entry and exit. As trade costs fall, reallocations of resources occur both within
firms, as surviving firms drop their marginally productive products, and across firms,
as firms with the lowest overall productivity exit. Though exporters are among the
firms dropping their least-productive products, the share of products they export as
well as their sales per exported product rise. Significantly, productivity increases both
within firms and within industries as trade costs fall. As a result, the model provides
an intuitive micro-foundation for the much-discussed idea that international trade spurs
firms to rationalize production, but one that does not imply money being left on the
table prior to liberalization.2
Our framework represents a significant departure from existing models of heteroge-
nous firms (e.g., Jovanovic 1982, Hopenhayn 1992, Ericson and Pakes 1995, Melitz 2003
and Bernard, Redding and Schott 2006a) which restrict firms to production of a single
product. The introduction of endogenous product scope creates a new margin of firm
adjustment, which generates novel firm and industry dynamics in response to trade lib-
eralization. As in existing heterogeneous firm models, the firms considered in this paper
vary in terms of productivity. Here, however, firm “productivity” in a given product is a
combination of two capabilities: firm-level “ability” and firm-product-level “expertise”.
We assume these two components of overall firm productivity to be stochastic, indepen-
1These figures come from Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2005) and are discussed further below. They define products as five-digit SIC and ten-digit Harmonized
System categories, respectively.
2The hypothesis that trade liberalization raises firm productivity by reducing X-ineﬃciency has a
long tradition, but theories of this form face the challenge of explaining X-ineﬃciency as an equilibrium
phenomenon (see for example the discussion in Lawrence 2000).
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dent, and unknown prior to firms paying a sunk cost of entry. These assumptions are
meant to capture the idea that even though some firms are successful in a broad range
of activities (e.g., General Electric), even the most successful firm may not be the most
eﬃcient producer of any given product. Though we assume that firm ability and product
expertise are uncorrelated, and that a firm’s expertise across products is uncorrelated, a
firm’s productivity across products is nevertheless positively correlated because higher
firm ability raises productivity in all products.3
The model works as follows. After a firm incurs the sunk entry cost, and after firm
ability as well as product expertise in all products are revealed, the firm decides which (if
any) of a continuum of products to manufacture. Firms that decide to enter at least one
product market must pay a fixed headquarters cost which is independent of the range of
products manufactured, as well as fixed production costs for each product market they
enter. Marginal costs of production vary across products, declining with firm ability
and product expertise. Ability varies across firms and expertise varies across products
for a firm with a particular ability. Firms with higher abilities have a lower zero-profit
cutoﬀ for product expertise, i.e., the level of product expertise at which variable profit
exceeds the fixed production costs. As a result, firms with greater ability can profitably
manufacture a larger range of products, extending their product scope. Though firms
with high ability enjoy higher average productivity than firms with lower ability, the
percentage diﬀerence in average productivity is smaller than the percentage diﬀerence
in ability as a result of their endogenous expansion into lower-expertise products.
The equilibrium of the model exhibits conventional self-selection of the most produc-
tive firms into production. Here, self selection across firms is driven by the interaction
of stochastic firm ability and fixed headquarters costs. Firms drawing low ability are
unable to generate enough variable profit to cover fixed headquarters costs from the
small number of products in which they have high expertise. They have low average
productivity and exit immediately.
With endogenous product scope, the model also features self-selection within firms.
Firms’ product selection is explained by the interaction of stochastic product expertise
and fixed production costs for each product. Firms that become active in a product have
systematically higher productivity in that product than in the products they choose not
to produce. They also have systematically higher productivity in that product than
firms that decide not to produce it.
Stochastic variation in firm ability yields a positive correlation between firms’ inten-
sive and extensive margins: more productive firms are on average larger not only because
they sell more of a given product but because they manufacture more products. This
positive correlation between intensive and extensive margins magnifies inequality in the
firm-size distribution and has general equilibrium implications for firms’ entry and exit
3An example of a firm ability that influences productivity across all products is proficiency in the
organization of production, including the use flexible manufacturing methods and other productivity-
enhancing techniques: see for example Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
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decisions. As higher-ability firms expand along the extensive margin into lower-expertise
products, demand for labor rises, wages increase and the profitability of lower-ability
firms declines. Relative to a setting with exogenous product scope, this mechanism
drives up the zero-profit threshold for ability above which firm entry is profitable.
One manifestation of the influence of endogenous product scope is the role it plays
in dampening firm entry and exit responses to exogenous shocks to market structure. In
conventional heterogeneous-firm models, an increase in sunk costs of entry, for example,
reduces the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ necessary for survival, allowing firms with
previously unprofitable levels of productivity to enter the market. As the sunk entry
cost rises above the expected value of entry, entry from the fringe declines, competition
is diminished and the ex post profitability of production increases. As a result the
zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ falls until the expected value of entry is equal to the new
higher sunk entry cost. When product scope is endogenous, the reduction in competition
induced by the higher sunk entry cost allows firms to expand along their extensive
margins into lower-expertise products. As a result, some of the increase in the ex post
profitability required for the expected value of entry to equal the new higher sunk cost of
entry is achieved through an expansion of product scope, implying a dampened decline
in the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ. While there is less reallocation through firm entry
and exit than in a model with exogenous product scope, firm entry and exit is only
part of overall reallocation which now also includes reallocation across products within
firms.4
The open economy equilibrium permits examination of a wide range of firm responses
to globalization. When international trade with fixed and variable trade costs is pos-
sible, the model reproduces the conventional result that only the highest-productivity
firms are profitable enough to overcome trade costs and become exporters. With en-
dogenous product scope, however, exporters ship only a relatively small fraction of their
overall output abroad. While exporters’ high-expertise products are profitable enough
to overcome trade costs and are sent abroad, their lower-expertise goods are confined to
the domestic market. In equilibrium the same product might be both exported and sold
domestically by some firms and only sold locally by others.
A key result of the model is that trade liberalization pressures firms to focus on
their “core competencies”.5 When product scope is endogenous, symmetric reductions
in countries’ fixed or variable trade costs cause all firms to drop their lowest-expertise
products. This result is driven by the general equilibrium influence of growing export
opportunities on labor markets. As trade costs fall, exporters’ foreign markets expand,
4For empirical evidence on firm entry and exit as a source of reallocation and productivity growth,
see Dunne et al. (1989), Baily et al. (1992) and Foster et al. (2001) among many others. For evidence
on the role of reallocation across products within firms, see Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b).
5The concept of core competencies appears in both the theory of the firm and the business strategy
literature (see for example Aghion and Tirole 1995, Ossa 2006, Porter 1998 and Sutton 2005). As
formalized here, core competencies refer to the products where firms have the greatest expertise.
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driving up their demand for labor and therefore wages. As wages rise, the profitability
of firms’ lowest-expertise products falls below the point at which they can cover fixed
costs. However, even though product scope contracts for all firms, declining trade costs
result in an increase in both the share of products exporters sell abroad as well as
their level of exports in each product. Because these reactions are driven by greater
export opportunities, they are all relatively more pronounced in countries’ comparative-
advantage industries.
Firms’ intensive- and extensive-margin responses to trade liberalization drive pro-
ductivity growth both within firms and across firms within industries. As firms drop
their lowest-expertise products, they raise the average productivity of products that sur-
vive and therefore raise overall firm productivity. Therefore, although firm ability and
product expertise are themselves fixed parameters, the model generates firm-level pro-
ductivity growth following trade liberalization due to reallocations of resources across
products within firms. This contrasts with existing models of heterogeneous firms and
trade, where firms manufacture a single product whose productivity is unaﬀected by
trade liberalization. Along with the conventional result that symmetric reductions in
trade costs cause the failure of low-productivity firms, endogenous product scope con-
tributes to aggregate productivity growth that is strongest in countries’ comparative-
advantage industries. Trade liberalization gives rise to endogenous Ricardian productiv-
ity diﬀerences at both the firm and industry level that magnify Heckscher-Ohlin-based
comparative advantage and provide an additional source of welfare gains from trade.
The positive correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins influences
adjustment in the domestic and export markets. As trade costs fall, there is a contraction
in production for the domestic market, through both a reduction in the amount of each
product supplied and the range of products oﬀered. At the same time, there is an
expansion in production for the export market, through both the amount of each product
exported and the range of products shipped abroad. Therefore, trade liberalization has
a magnified impact on the firm-size distribution relative to a model with exogenous
product scope. High-ability exporting firms are larger than low-ability non-exporting
firms, not only because they sell more of a given product in the domestic market, but also
because they manufacture a larger range of products and export a range of products.
Again these implications of trade liberalization vary with comparative advantage, so
that firms in comparative-advantage industries export a greater share of their output
of a given product and a greater fraction of their products than those in comparative
disadvantage industries.
The research in this paper complements existing models of product scope in indus-
trial organization and international trade. Early research on multi-product firms in the
industrial organization literature by Baumol (1977), Panzar and Willig (1977) and oth-
ers (see the survey in Bailey and Friedlaender 1982) emphasized supply-side economies
of scope. More recent contributions by Brander and Eaton (1984), Shaked and Sut-
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ton (1990), Eaton and Schmidt (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2003) have introduced
demand-side considerations and strategic interaction between firms. In contrast to these
studies, we examine multi-product firms within a general equilibrium model of indus-
try dynamics where firms are heterogeneous and entry and exit is endogenous. Klette
and Kortum (2004) develop a model of industry dynamics with these features, in which
products are symmetric within firms, and research and development (R&D) discoveries
expand product scope and drive firm growth. In contrast, our approach emphasizes the
interaction of general competencies (“ability”) and product-specific competencies (“ex-
pertise”), which together explain within-firm heterogeneity, and generate the positive
correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins. While the industrial organi-
zation literature concentrates on a closed economy, a key concern of our analysis is the
role of international trade in shaping both firm and industry productivity.
In the international trade literature, Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) use a model of
multi-product multinationals to explain two-way Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) within
industries. In the presence of trade costs, multi-product firms are able to reduce inter-
variety competition by locating production of some varieties abroad through FDI. Eckel
and Neary (2006) develop a theory of multi-product firms, in which each firm has an ideal
product but can produce additional products by incurring an adaptation cost that rises
with the number of products. Firms compete under conditions of Cournot oligopoly sub-
ject to quasi-linear preferences. This framework captures strategic interaction between
firms but, in contrast to the analysis below, assumes that the number of multi-product
firms is exogenous and that multi-product firms are homogeneous within industries.6
Nocke and Yeaple (2006) develop a theory of multi-product firms in which firms vary
in terms of a single dimension, “organizational capability”, and in which a firm’s pro-
ductivity for all of its products declines with the number of products manufactured. In
equilibrium, firms with higher organizational capability produce a greater number of
products but have lower overall productivity than firms with low organizational capa-
bility. In contrast with this paper, and the stylized facts discussed below, their model
predicts an equal distribution of output across products within multi-product firms, and
a negative correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins.
The assumptions upon which our model is based are motivated by the large body
of empirical evidence that firm entry and exit and within-industry reallocation across
heterogeneous firms are key features of trade liberalizations (see for example Pavcnik
2002, Trefler 2004 and the survey by Tybout 2003). Our model highlights the way
in which trade liberalization raises the expected value of industry entry and induces
endogenous changes in firm entry and exit that cause multi-product firms to focus on
their core competencies. The correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins,
6A large empirical literature documents substantial heterogeneity across firms within industries and
between exporters and non-exporters. See, for example, the survey by Bartelsman and Doms (2000)
and Bernard and Jensen (1995). In a partial equilibrium version of their analysis, Eckel and Neary
(2006) consider firm heterogeneity.
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which is a key prediction of our framework and which receives empirical support, is driven
by the within-industry heterogeneity in firm ability across multi-product firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
empirical motivation for the model. Section 3 introduces the structure of the model
and Section 4 solves for the closed economy equilibrium. In Section 5 we characterize a
number of properties of the closed economy equilibrium. Section 6 opens the economy
to international trade. Section 7 solves for the open economy equilibrium and Section
8 develops a number of predictions for the eﬀects of trade liberalization. Section 9
generalizes the model to two industries and factors of production to consider the influence
of comparative advantage. Section 10 concludes. Appendices A and B contain data and
theory appendices respectively.
2. Empirical Motivation
Our model and its assumptions are motivated by a series of stylized facts about
multi-product firms reported by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b) and Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2005), henceforth BRS and BJS, respectively. These facts document
the importance of multi-product firms for aggregate production and trade as well as
the substantial heterogeneity of products within firms. In this section we discuss these
stylized facts and oﬀer others that are inspired by our main theoretical results.
Multi-product firms dominate U.S. manufacturing and trade. Analyzing quinquen-
nial manufacturing censuses from 1972 to 1997, BRS find that an average 41 percent
of U.S. manufacturing firms produce more than a single product, but that these firms
account for an average of 91 percent of output. Moreover, net product adding and drop-
ping by incumbent firms accounts for roughly one third of aggregate U.S. manufacturing
growth between 1972 and 1997, a contribution that dwarfs that of new firm entry and
exit. Similarly, BJS (2005), analyzing U.S. trade data for 2000, show that firms that
export more than ten products make up 17 percent of exporting firms but account for
94 percent of all exports.7
BRS demonstrate that the goods produced by multi-product firms exhibit substantial
heterogeneity. The same firm, for example, often produces products in more than a
single four- or even two-digit SIC industry. In addition, firms’ product-size distribution
is highly skewed, with a firm’s largest product accounting for an average of forty percent
of overall firm output. BRS also show that product characteristics such as relative size
and tenure with the firm are associated with firms’ decisions to drop products from their
7In the U.S. production data, BRS define a product as a five-digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) category. This level of aggregation breaks manufacturing into roughly 1800 products. In the
U.S. trade data, BRS define a product as a ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) category. This level of
aggregation breaks all U.S. exports into roughly 8,500 products, with manufacturing products making
up approximately two thirds of this total. We discuss the relationship between the levels of aggregation
in the production and trade data below.
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portfolios. After controlling for firm and product fixed eﬀects, a firm is more likely to
exit a product where its output and tenure are small relative to those of its rivals.
Our model highlights the contribution of firms’ extensive margins to the firm-size
distribution. Here, we augment the existing stylized facts on multi-product firms by
examining this contribution empirically across U.S. firms. Total firm output (Yf) is the
sum of output of individual products (ypf ), which equals the number of products (nf)
times average output per product (y¯f),
Yf = nf y¯f , y¯f ≡
1
nf
X
p
ypf (1)
where f and p index firms and products respectively. This relationship provides the
basis for a regression decomposition of variation in firm size into the contributions of the
extensive and intensive margins. The log number of products and log average output
per product are each separately regressed on log total firm output,
lnnf = α1 + β1 lnYf + uf (2)
ln y¯f = α2 + β2 lnYf + εf
where uf and εf are stochastic errors and, by the properties of OLS, β1 + β2 = 1.
The coeﬃcients β1 and β2 capture the partial correlations between total firm output
and the extensive and intensive margins respectively. When total firm output increases,
β1 captures the percentage contribution from the number of products (the extensive
margin), holding constant average output per product (the intensive margin). Similarly,
β2 captures the percentage contribution of the intensive margin, holding constant the
extensive margin. A similar decomposition may be undertaken for total firm exports into
the contributions of the number of products exported and average exports per product.
Regression decompositions for both production and exporting are contained in Table
1. For brevity we report results for β1 given that β2 = 1− β1. The first two columns of
the table summarize the results of regressing the log number of five-digit SIC manufac-
turing products produced by U.S. multi-product firms in 1997 on their log total output
in that year. The dataset is identical to that examined by BRS and is drawn from the
Longitudinal Research Database of the United States Bureau of the Census (see Ap-
pendix A). Column one displays the decomposition from an OLS regression, where we
find that firms’ extensive margins account for 13 percent of the variation in total firm
output.
Column two of Table 1 reports an analogous decomposition of U.S. firm-product
exports in 2000 using trade data from BJS.8 Here, we find that variation in the number
8These data diﬀer from the manufacturing data in two important ways. First, the product classifi-
cation is much more disaggregated. Second, the products span all sectors, i.e., they are not confined
to manufacturing. Undertaking the decomposition at a common level of aggregation (SIC4) for manu-
facturing alone, we find that the contributions of the intensive and extensive margins are of a similar
magnitude for export and production data.
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Table 1: Regression Decompositions of U.S. Firm Shipments and Exports
Production 
(1997)
Exporting 
(2000)
ln Firm Shipments 0.1321
0.0002
ln Firm Exports 0.1382
0.0002
Observations 109,267 63,322
R-Squared 0.85 0.83
Notes: Table reports firm-level OLS regressions of the
number of products produced and exported by U.S.-
based firms on the total shipments and exports of the
firm, respectively. Data are for noted years, and
sample includes all multi-product firms in the noted
year. Both coefficient estimates are significant at the 1
percent level.
of products exported by firms is responsible for 14 percent of the variation in their total
exports.
One of the distinguishing features of the model that we develop below is a positive
correlation between firms’ extensive and intensive margins. To examine this correlation
in the data, we regress firms’ average output or exports per product on the number of
products the firm produces or exports,
ln y¯f = η + γ lnnf + χf , (3)
where χf is a stochastic error.
9 Results are reported in Table 2. As indicated in the
table, firms’ intensive and extensive margins are correlated positively and significantly
in both production and exporting. These results demonstrate that larger firms produce
and export a larger number of products and also exhibit larger output or exports per
product than smaller firms.10
A central feature of our model is that firm productivity consists of a component that
is common across all products (ability) and a component that is specific to individual
products (expertise). Since log firm sales in the model are proportional to log produc-
tivity, variation in firm-product sales can be similarly decomposed. Here, we regress the
log of firm-product shipments for the year 1997 on a full set of product fixed eﬀects and
a full set of firm fixed eﬀects. We examine the R2 of these regressions to gauge their
9We note that because y¯f includes 1/n, measurement error in the number of products n induces a
negative correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins. As a result, the results reported in
Table 2 likely provide a lower bound to the strength of the positive correlation between firms’ intensive
and expensive margins.
10Our findings on the role of the extensive margin in accounting for variation in total firm size or
exports are robust across a number of specifications. We re-estimated the specifications as five-year
diﬀerences, which eliminates the variation in the number of products and average firm output per
product due to time-invariant factors. We also re-estimated the specification separately for each two-
digit industry, where we allocate firms to two-digit industries based on the product that accounts for
the majority of their shipments. In each case, we find a substantial role for the extensive margin and a
positive correlation between firm’s intensive and extensive margins.
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Table 2: Correlation of U.S. Firms’ Extensive and Intensive Margins
ln Number of Products 0.491 0.643
0.011 0.006
Observations 109,267 63,322
R-Squared 0.02 0.16
Production 
(1997)
Exporting 
(2000)
Notes: Table reports firm-level OLS regressions of the
average log shipments or exports per product of U.S.
firms on the log number of products produced and
exported, respectively, in the noted years. Sample
includes all multi-product firms in the noted year. All
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.
relative importance.11
The first column of Table 3 reports the OLS adjusted-R2 for the specification with
product fixed eﬀects, which control for heterogeneity in average shipment values across
products. We find that product fixed eﬀects account for 30 percent of the variation in
the firm-product shipments of multi-product firms and 28 percent of the variation for all
firms. The second column of Table 3 contains the adjusted-R2 for the regression with
both product and firm fixed eﬀects, where the firm fixed eﬀects capture the common
component of firm shipments across all products (i.e., ability). We find that the adjusted-
R2 of the regression rises to 49 percent for multi-product firms and 54 percent for all
firms. These adjusted-R2 imply that there is a common component of firm shipments
that is not only statistically significant but also explains a substantial proportion of
the diﬀerences in shipments across firms. The unexplained variation in the data is 51
percent for multi-product firms and 46 percent for all firms, confirming the importance
of considerations that are idiosyncratic to individual pairings of firms and products (i.e.,
expertise).
Table 3: Common and Idiosyncratic Components of Firm-Product Shipments
Product Fixed 
Effects
Product and 
Firm Fixed 
Effects Observations
Multiple-Product Firms 0.30 0.49 212,691
All Firms 0.28 0.54 305,623
Notes: Table reports adjusted R2s of OLS regressions of 1997 firm-
product shipments in 1997 on product as well as firm and product
fixed effects. First row reports results for multiple-product firms.
Results in the second row are for all firms.
11Shipments vary across individual firm-product pairs and so the data have a panel structure, with
dimensions of firms and products, permitting the inclusion of the both firm and product fixed eﬀects.
We report adjusted-R2 to control for the number of fixed eﬀects being estimated. We report results
for multi-product firms as well as for all firms, since firm fixed eﬀects perfectly explain variation in
the shipments of single-product firms. As indicated in the table, including single product firms in the
sample results in a higher contribution of the firm fixed eﬀects.
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3. The Model
We consider a framework where firms can choose whether to participate in multiple
product markets and compete with one another in supplying horizontally diﬀerentiated
varieties within those product markets. Products are imperfect substitutes in demand
and require specific production expertise. The model can be interpreted as capturing
an economy consisting of many products or as capturing an industry (e.g. consumer
electronics) with many products (e.g. DVD-players, Televisions and MP3-players) of
which firms supply distinct varieties (e.g. Sony, JVC and Panasonic). In section 9, we
consider a multi-industry version of the model.
3.1. Preferences
The representative consumer derives utility from the consumption of a continuum
of products which we normalize to the interval [0, 1]. There is a constant elasticity of
substitution across products so that the utility function takes the following form:
U =
∙Z 1
0
Cνi di
¸ 1
ν
, 0 < ν < 1. (4)
where i indexes products. Within each product market, a continuum of firms produce
diﬀerentiated varieties of the product, so that Ci is a consumption index which also takes
the constant elasticity of substitution form:
Ci =
∙Z
ω∈Ω
ci (ω)
ρ dω
¸ 1
ρ
, 0 < ρ < 1. (5)
where ω indexes varieties.12 We make the natural assumption that the elasticity of
substitution across varieties within products is greater than the elasticity of substitution
across products, σ ≡ 1
1−ρ > κ ≡
1
1−ν > 1, and the price index dual to (5) is:
Pi =
∙Z
ω∈Ω
pi (ω)
1−σ
¸ 1
1−σ
. (6)
3.2. Production Technology
The specification of entry and production follows Melitz (2003). However, we aug-
ment that model to allow firms to manufacture multiple products and to allow for
uncertainty about productivity that is specific to individual product markets. There is
a competitive fringe of potential firms who are identical prior to entry. In order to enter,
firms must incur a sunk entry cost of fe > 0 units of labor. After the sunk cost is paid,
12Our model focuses on firms that supply multiple products for final consumption. While vertical
integration provides another reason why firms may produce multiple products (intermediate and final),
it is clear that many manufacturing firms supply multiple products for final consumption.
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firms draw a productivity in each product. Motivated by the empirical findings above,
we model a firm’s productivity in a product as depending upon two components: “abil-
ity” ϕ ∈ (0,∞) that is common to all products and drawn from a distribution g (ϕ), and
“expertise” λi ∈ (0,∞) that is specific to each product and drawn from a distribution
z (λ). Therefore, while ϕ varies across firms, λi is specific to individual pairings of firms
and products. This conceptualization of firm productivity captures the idea that some
components of firm productivity enhance eﬃciency for the firm as a whole while other
components (e.g. specialized technical knowledge) only apply within particular product
markets.13 The two distributions g (ϕ) and z (λ) are independent of one another and
common to all firms, and the product expertise distribution is independently and iden-
tically distributed across products. The continuous cumulative distribution functions
for firm ability and product expertise are denoted by G (ϕ) and Z (λ). We focus on
an interior equilibrium where no firm manufactures all products and where each firm
derives positive profits from a range of products. Therefore we assume the following
regularity conditions for the distributions of ability and expertise: limϕ→0 g (ϕ) > 0,
limϕ→∞G (ϕ)→ 1, limλ→0 z (λ) > 0, and limλ→∞Z (λ)→ 1.
Incurring the sunk entry cost creates the blueprint for one horizontally diﬀerentiated
variety of each product.14 Once the sunk cost has been paid, and firm ability and product
expertise are observed, firms decide whether to enter and in which product markets to
participate. For now, labor is the sole factor of production and is in inelastic supply L
(which also indexes the size of the economy).15 There is a fixed corporate headquarters
cost of fh > 0 units of labor which the firm must incur irrespective of the number of
product markets in which it is active and a fixed production cost of fp > 0 units of labor
for each product. There is a constant marginal cost of production for each product which
depends on the interaction of firm ability and product expertise. Total labor employed
by a firm is therefore:
l (ϕ) = fh +
Z 1
0
Ii
∙
fp +
q (ϕ, λi)
ϕλi
¸
di, (7)
where Ii is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm produces product i and zero
otherwise, and q (ϕ, λi) denotes output of product i by a firm with firm ability ϕ and
product expertise λi.
Even though the distributions g (ϕ) and z (λ) have been assumed to be independent
of one another, a firm’s productivity in a product market i, θi ≡ ϕλi, depends on both
13The two features that are important for our analysis are the variation in productivity across products
within firms and the variation in average productivity across firms. While our formulation captures
these features in an intuitive and tractable way, one could also generate idiosyncratic variation in
firm-product productivity from a pairwise interaction between firm and product characteristics.
14Our framework can be extended to allow for endogenous measures of varieties within each product,
introducing the potential for strategic interaction since firms are no longer of measure zero relative to
each product.
15We analyze a setting with two factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor, in Section 9.
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firm ability and product expertise. In particular, a higher level of firm ability ϕ raises
productivity θi across all products i. Therefore, productivity (the combination of firm
ability and product expertise) is positively correlated across products, but the correlation
is imperfect due to the stochastic variation in product expertise.16
3.3. Firm-Product Profitability
Demand for a product variety depends upon the own variety price, the price index
for the product and the price indices for all other products. If a firm is active in a
product market, it manufactures one of a continuum of varieties and so is unable to
influence the price index for the product. At the same time, the price of firm’s variety
in one product market only influences the demand for its varieties in other product
markets through the price indices. Therefore, the firm’s inability to influence the price
indices implies that its profit maximization problem reduces to choosing the price of each
product variety separately to maximize the profits derived from that product variety.17
This optimization problem yields the standard result that the equilibrium price of a
product variety is a constant mark-up over marginal cost:
pi (ϕ, λi) =
1
ρ
w
ϕλi
, (8)
where we choose the wage for the numeraire and so w = 1.
Substituting for the pricing rule, and using the choice of numeraire, equilibrium
revenue and profits from a product variety are:
ri (ϕ, λi) = Ri (ρPiϕλi)
σ−1 , πi (ϕ, λi) =
ri (ϕ, λi)
σ
− fp, (9)
where Ri denotes aggregate expenditure on product i. From equation (9), the ratio of
revenue for two varieties of the same product depends solely on their relative productiv-
ities:
ri (ϕ
00, λ00i ) = (ϕ
00/ϕ0)σ−1 (λ00/λ0)σ−1 ri (ϕ0, λ0i) . (10)
A firm with a particular ability draw ϕ and expertise draw λi decides whether or
not to produce a product based on a comparison of revenue and fixed production costs
for the product. For each firm ability ϕ, there is a zero-profit cutoﬀ for product
expertise λ∗i (ϕ), such that the firm will enter the product if it draws a value of λi equal
16Note this property does not depend on firm ability and product expertise combining multiplicatively
(θi ≡ ϕλi). All we require is that, for two firms with the same expertise (λi), the firm with a higher
ability (ϕ) has the higher productivity (θi) in the product. This would be satisfied by for example a
linear specification (θi ≡ ϕ+ λi).
17The structure of our model eliminates strategic interaction within or between firms. This choice of
model structure enables us to focus purely on the implications of introducing multi-product firms into
a standard model of industry dynamics with ongoing entry, exit and firm heterogeneity.
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to or greater than λ∗i (ϕ). For each firm ability ϕ, the value of λ
∗
i (ϕ) is defined by the
following zero-profit condition:
ri (ϕ, λ
∗
i (ϕ)) = σfp. (11)
We refer to the lowest level of ability where a firm finds it profitable to incur the
fixed headquarters cost and enter as the zero-profit cutoﬀ for firm ability ϕ∗. The
zero-profit cutoﬀ for product expertise for a firm with ability ϕ∗ is defined by:
ri (ϕ
∗, λ∗i (ϕ
∗)) = σfp. (12)
Since there is a continuum of identical products, the zero-profit cutoﬀ for product
expertise is the same across all products: λ∗i (ϕ) = λ
∗ (ϕ) for all i. Furthermore, since
product expertise is independently and identically distributed, the law of large numbers
implies that the fraction of products manufactured by a firm with a particular level of
ability ϕ equals the probability of that firm drawing a product expertise above λ∗ (ϕ),
that is [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))].
3.4. Firm Profitability
A firm with a particular ability draw ϕ decides whether or not to enter based on a
comparison of the fixed headquarters cost and total profits across those products where
its product expertise draw λi is greater than the zero-profit cutoﬀ λ∗ (ϕ).
With a continuum of identical products and independent draws for product expertise,
the law of large numbers implies that a firm’s expected revenue across the continuum
of products equals its expected revenue for an individual product. Expected revenue
for an individual product is a function of firm ability ϕ and equals the probability of
drawing a product expertise above the zero-profit cutoﬀ λ∗ (ϕ) times expected revenue
conditional on profitable production. Therefore total firm revenue across the unit interval
of products is:
r (ϕ) =
Z 1
0
∙Z ∞
0
r (ϕ, λi)μz (λi) dλi
¸
di (13)
= [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
r (ϕ, λ)
µ
z (λ)
1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))
¶
dλ
=
Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
r (ϕ, λ) z (λ) dλ,
where the ex post distribution for product expertise μz (λi) is a truncation of the ex ante
distribution z (λ) above the zero-profit cutoﬀ for product expertise λ∗ (ϕ).
Total profits across products equal expected profits for an individual product minus
fixed headquarters costs. Firm profits are therefore equal to the probability of drawing
a product expertise above the zero-profit cutoﬀ λ∗ (ϕ) times expected profits conditional
on profitable production minus fixed headquarters costs:
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π (ϕ) = [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
∙Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
µ
r (ϕ, λ)
σ
− fp
¶µ
z (λ)
1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))
¶
dλ
¸
− fh (14)
=
Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
µ
r (ϕ, λ)
σ
− fp
¶
z (λ) dλ− fh.
The lower the ability of a firm ϕ, the higher the zero-profit cutoﬀ for product expertise
λ∗ (ϕ), and so the lower the probability of drawing a product expertise suﬃciently high
to profitably manufacture a product. Firms with lower abilities have lower expected
profits in an individual product market and manufacture a smaller fraction of products
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]. For suﬃciently low draws of firm ability, the excess of revenue over
fixed production costs in the small range of profitable products falls short of the fixed
headquarters cost. Therefore, the requirement that firm profits net of fixed headquarters
costs are greater than or equal to zero defines a zero-profit cutoﬀ for firm ability ϕ∗, such
that only firms who draw an ability equal to or greater than ϕ∗ enter:
π (ϕ∗) = 0. (15)
3.5. Free Entry
Firms from the competitive fringe decide whether or not to enter based on a com-
parison of the expected value of entry and the sunk entry cost. We assume that there is
a constant exogenous probability of firm death (δ), as a result of force majeure events
beyond the manager’s control, which generates ongoing firm entry and exit. Therefore,
the expected value of entry (ve) is the ex ante probability of successful entry, multiplied
by average firm profits conditional on entry (π¯), and discounted by the probability of
firm death. Free entry requires:
ve =
[1−G (ϕ∗)] π¯
δ
= fe, (16)
where the ex ante probability of successful entry is [1−G (ϕ∗)].
Firm revenue for a particular value of ability ϕ is given in equation (14). Taking
expectations over values for ability yields average firm revenue conditional on entry:
r¯ =
Z ∞
0
r (ϕ)μg (ϕ) dϕ, (17)
=
Z ∞
ϕ∗
r (ϕ)
µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗)
¶
dϕ,
where the ex post distribution for ability μg (ϕ) is a truncation of the ex ante distribution
g (ϕ) above the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability ϕ∗ where entry occurs. The expression for
average firm profits conditional on entry π¯ is analogous and takes expectations over
values for ability in equation (14).
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3.6. Goods and Labor Markets
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of firms entering
each period,Me, and a constant mass of firms producing,M . Each of the firms producing
is active in a subset of product markets. The steady-state mass of firms manufacturing
an individual product,Mp, is a constant fraction of the mass of firms producing, and this
fraction is the same across products. The steady-state equilibrium is also characterized
by stationary distributions of firm ability and product expertise that are determined by
the zero-profit cutoﬀs ϕ∗ and λ∗ (ϕ) and that are again the same across products.
From the equilibrium pricing rule (8), the aggregate price index for each product can
be written as a function of the mass of firms manufacturing the product and the price
of a variety with a weighted average of firm ability and product expertise:
P =M
1
1−σ
p
1
ρϕ˜
, (18)
where the weighted average ϕ˜ depends on the ex post distributions of firm ability and
product expertise and is defined in the appendix.
Of the mass of firms with a particular ability ϕ, a fraction [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))] are active in
an individual product market. Therefore, the mass of firms manufacturing an individual
product is the following fraction of the mass of firms:
Mp =
∙Z ∞
ϕ∗
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗)
¶
dϕ
¸
M. (19)
With a constant mass of firms producing in steady-state, the mass of firms that draw
an ability suﬃciently high to enter must equal the mass of firms that die, implying the
following steady-state stability condition:
[1−G (ϕ∗)]Me = δM. (20)
Finally, labor market clearing implies that the demand for labor in production and
entry equals the economy’s aggregate supply of labor:
Lq + Le = L¯, (21)
where the subscripts q and e respectively denote labor used in production and entry.
4. Closed Economy Equilibrium
The closed economy equilibrium is completely referenced by the quadruple {ϕ∗,
λ∗ (ϕ∗), P , R}. All other endogenous variables can be written as functions of these
four elements of the equilibrium vector.
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4.1. Multi-Product Firms
We begin by determining the zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise for every firm as a
function of its ability and the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability ϕ∗. Combining the zero-profit
cutoﬀ for expertise for a firm with ability ϕ in equation (11), the zero-profit cutoﬀ for
expertise for a firm with ability ϕ∗ in equation (12), and the relationship between the
revenues of varieties from equation (10), we obtain:
λ∗ (ϕ) =
µ
ϕ∗
ϕ
¶
λ∗ (ϕ∗) . (22)
Intuitively, an increase in ability ϕ reduces a firm’s zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise
λ∗ (ϕ) because higher ability raises productivity in each product, and so suﬃcient revenue
to cover fixed production costs is generated at a lower value of expertise. In contrast,
an increase in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability ϕ∗ raises a firm’s zero-profit cutoﬀ for
expertise λ∗ (ϕ) because it raises the average productivity of rival firms’ products, and
so intensifies product market competition, and hence increases the value for expertise at
which suﬃcient revenue is generated to cover fixed production costs.
To determine λ∗ (ϕ∗), we combine the requirement that zero profits are made by a
firm with ability ϕ∗ in equation (15) with the expression for firm profits in equation
(14). We substitute for product revenue using the relationship between relative variety
revenues in equation (10) and the zero-profit condition for product expertise in equation
(12). Together these equations yield the following expression that implicitly defines a
unique value of λ∗i (ϕ
∗) as a function of model parameters alone:Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ∗)
"µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ∗)
¶σ−1
− 1
#
fpz (λ) dλ = fh, ⇒ λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ. (23)
Equations (22) and (23) jointly determine the zero-profit cutoﬀs for expertise for
a firm as a function of its ability and the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability. Three parameters
influence a firm’s zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise for given values of its ability (ϕ) and the
zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability (ϕ∗): the fixed production cost (fp), the elasticity of substitution
(σ) and the fixed headquarters cost (fh).
From equation (23) it can be seen that an increase in the fixed production cost or
the elasticity of substitution raises λ∗ (ϕ∗), which in turn raises the zero-profit cutoﬀ for
expertise for firms of all abilities, λ∗ (ϕ). Intuitively, a higher fixed production cost raises
the equilibrium level of product revenue needed for zero profits to be achieved. Since
product revenue is increasing in expertise, the higher level of product revenue needed for
zero profits implies a higher value of the zero-profit cutoﬀ for product expertise λ∗ (ϕ).
Similarly, increases in the elasticity of substitution reduce the revenue of low-expertise
products relative to that of higher expertise products. Once again, this implies that a
higher level of product expertise is required to achieve zero profits and so λ∗ (ϕ) rises.
Note higher elasticities of substitution correspond to less love of variety and so diminish
firms’ incentives to expand along the extensive margin into lower-expertise products.
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An increase in the fixed headquarters cost has the opposite eﬀect of an increase
in fixed production costs. Higher fixed headquarter costs reduce λ∗ (ϕ∗) and thereby
reduce the zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise for firms of all abilities, λ∗ (ϕ). This third
and somewhat surprising comparative static is a property of general equilibrium. As
the fixed headquarters cost rises, the ex post profits of firms across all products decline,
depressing entry and diminishing product-market competition. As competition declines,
firms with lower product-expertise draws can generate suﬃcient profits to cover fixed
production costs, and so the zero-profit cutoﬀ for product expertise falls.
The zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise determines the fraction of product markets where
a firm produces, [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]. Therefore, equations (22) and (23) together determine
endogenous product scope as a function of a firm’s ability ϕ, the zero-profit cutoﬀ for
ability ϕ∗ and model parameters. The relationship between a firm’s product scope and
its ability is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. For a firm that draws an ability less
than ϕ∗, average profits across products are insuﬃcient to cover fixed headquarters costs,
and the firm exits immediately. A firm that draws an ability ϕ∗ manufactures varieties
in a range of products
£
1− Z
¡
λ¯
¢¤
. The range of products manufactured by a firm
is monotonically increasing in ability and converges asymptotically towards one. Our
analysis is consistent with a wide range of distributions for product expertise, and the
exact shape of the relationship shown in Figure 1 will vary with diﬀerent functional
forms for the product expertise distribution.
Figure 1: Product Scope and Firm Ability
4.2. Free Entry
As shown in the appendix, average firm revenue and average firm profits can be
re-written so that they are functions of only the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability (ϕ∗) and the
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zero-profit-cutoﬀ expertise for a firm with this ability (λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯). Once rewritten in
this way, it is clear that average firm revenue, r¯ = r¯
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
, and average firm profits,
π¯ = π¯
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
, are monotonically decreasing in both ϕ∗ and λ¯. Intuitively, a higher value
of ϕ∗ implies a higher average ability of a firm’s competitors and so lower average prices
of competing varieties, which reduces average firm revenue and average firm profits.
Similarly, a higher value of λ¯ implies a higher average product expertise of the varieties
manufactured by competitors and hence lower average prices of competing varieties.
Substituting for average profits in the free entry condition, the requirement that the
expected value of entry equals the sunk entry cost becomes:
ve =
1
δ
Z ∞
ϕ∗
"Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
"µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
#
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ = fe, (24)
which is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗, since λ∗ (ϕ) = (ϕ∗/ϕ) λ¯. The free entry condi-
tion in equation (24) implicitly defines a unique zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability as a function
of model parameters alone.
The comparative statics of the free entry condition are intuitive. As the product
fixed production cost (fp) rises, so does the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability (ϕ∗), since a
higher productivity is required in each product to generate suﬃcient revenue to cover the
fixed production cost, and greater ability raises productivity in all products. Increases
in either the fixed headquarters cost (fh) or the sunk entry cost (fe) reduce the zero-
profit cutoﬀ for ability via the same logic discussed above: as the fixed headquarters cost
rises, the ex post profits of firms across all products decline, thereby depressing entry
and diminishing product market competition. As product market competition declines,
firms with lower ability are capable of generating suﬃcient profits across all products to
cover fixed headquarters cost and so the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability falls. A rise in the
sunk cost of entry also reduces entry, and so has a similar eﬀect on the zero-profit cutoﬀ
for ability as a rise in the fixed headquarters cost.
4.3. Goods and Labor Markets
So far we have solved for the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability ϕ∗ and the zero-profit-cutoﬀ
expertise for a firm with this level of ability λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯, which implies from equation
(22) that we have pinned down the zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise λ∗ (ϕ) and hence
equilibrium product scope for firms of all abilities ϕ. Together ϕ∗ and λ¯ determine the
ex post distributions of firm ability and product expertise and hence pin down average
variety prices as well as average firm revenue (r¯ = r¯
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
) and average firm profits
(π¯ = π¯
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
).
Total payments to labor used in production equal aggregate revenue minus aggregate
profits, Lq = R − Π. Combining the steady-state stability and free entry conditions,
equations (20) and (16), it can be shown that total payments to labor used in entry
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equal aggregate profits, Le = Π. Therefore, aggregate revenue equals the economy’s
aggregate supply of labor, R = L, and the labor market clears.
We are now in a position to determine the price index for each product, which depends
on average variety prices and the mass of firms producing each product in equation (18).
Average variety prices have already been determined above. The mass of firms producing
each product,Mp, is a constant fraction of the mass of firms producing any product, M ,
in equation (19). The mass of firms producing any product equals aggregate revenue
divided by average firm revenue,M = R/r¯, where we have solved for both aggregate and
average firm revenue. The constant fraction of firms that produce each product depends
solely on the zero-profit cutoﬀ for firm ability ϕ∗ and the zero-profit cutoﬀs for expertise
λ∗ (ϕ) for which we have already solved. Therefore, we have determined the price index
and completed the characterization of the equilibrium quadruple {ϕ∗, λ∗ (ϕ∗), P , R}.
5. Properties of the Closed Economy Equilibrium
The equilibrium range of products manufactured by a firm is shaped by two sets of
considerations. On the one hand, the firm charges a lower price for products where it
has higher productivity and as a result enjoys higher sales. This force for specialization
causes the firm to expand along the intensive margin in those products where it has
higher productivity. On the other hand, consumer preferences display a love of variety
and there is diminishing marginal utility to consuming more of any one variety. Dimin-
ishing marginal utility implies that the firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for
each product, which constrains sales and limits expansion along the intensive margin.
This force for diversification induces the firm to expand along the extensive margin into
products where it has a lower productivity. Nonetheless, the firm must derive suﬃcient
revenue from each product to cover fixed production costs, which constrains the firm’s
incentive to expand along the extensive margin.
Proposition 1 There is a positive correlation between firms’ intensive margins (how
much of a product is produced) and their extensive margins (how many products are
produced).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 summarizes a key prediction of our framework, namely the positive
correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins which matches the empirical
findings in Table 2. More productive firms are larger on average, not only because
they sell more of a given product, but because they manufacture more products. The
explanation for this positive correlation lies in firm ability’s role as a component of
productivity that is common across products. On one hand, higher ability raises a firm’s
productivity in a given product, thereby lowering the firm’s price for that product, and
increasing the quantity sold. On the other hand, higher ability also lowers the zero-profit
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cutoﬀ for expertise above which the firm finds it profitable to enter a product market,
thereby expanding the range of products manufactured by the firm.18 Our framework
endogenizes a new margin of firm decisions, the range of products to produce, which
is typically left umodelled through the explicit or implicit assumption of single-product
firms. The distribution of products across firms is non-random, with higher ability firms
characterized by systematically larger equilibrium ranges of products. Note that the
correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins exists even though expertise
draws are uncorrelated across products by assumption. Assuming that expertise draws
were positively correlated across products would only strengthen the correlation.
Corollary 1 Multi-product firms’ endogenous decisions about product scope magnify in-
equality in the firm-size distribution: the percentage diﬀerence in revenue between two
firms with abilities ϕ00 and ϕ0 (where ϕ00 > ϕ0) is strictly greater than when all firms have
the same exogenous product scope (λ∗ (ϕ) = λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯ for all ϕ).
Proof. See appendix.
The positive correlation between the intensive and extensive margin magnifies in-
equality in the firm-size production. Firms with higher abilities are larger than those
with lower abilities for two reasons: they sell more of any given product and they man-
ufacture more products. This prediction of the model has implications for the large
theoretical and empirical literature concerned with the firm-size distribution (see for
example Axtell 2001, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2005, and the survey by Sutton 1997).
The positive correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins in our model
implies that a smaller variance in firm ability is required to explain the observed disper-
sion in firm sizes than in a model where product scope is exogenous. A given increase in
firm ability leads to a larger increase in firm size than it would with exogenous product
scope because of firms’ endogenous expansion along their extensive margins.
Proposition 2 (a) Firm weighted-average productivity λ˜ (ϕ) is monotonically increas-
ing in firm ability ϕ, (b) The percentage diﬀerence in firm weighted average productivity
λ˜ (ϕ) is smaller than the percentage diﬀerence in firm ability ϕ.
Proof. See appendix.
While inequality in firm sizes is magnified by endogenous product scope, the disper-
sion in average productivity across firms in an industry is compressed. Note, a firm’s
18We note that firms’ intensive and extensive margins do not have to be positively correlated. Limited
managerial time and other diseconomies of scope provide potential reasons why more productive firms
may have a greater incentive to specialize in those products where they are most productive, inducing a
negative correlation between the two margins. However, the data reveal a positive correlation between
the intensive and extensive margins, as predicted by our framework where firms can “leverage” their
ability ϕ across multiple product markets.
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weighted-average productivity (λ˜ (ϕ)) depends upon the productivities of all the prod-
ucts it manufactures, as defined formally in the appendix.19 As ability increases, a
firm’s weighted-average productivity rises because it becomes more productive in all of
the products that it currently manufactures. At the same time, an increase in ability
induces the firm to expand along the extensive margin into new products, where it has
less expertise and so is less productive. The addition of these lower-expertise prod-
ucts reduces the firm’s weighted-average productivity, which therefore rises less than
proportionately with ability.20 An implication of this finding is that measures of the
productivity of multi-product firms based on total firm output and total firm inputs
will be systematically biased. If product range were held constant, the diﬀerence in
productivity between a high and low-ability firm would be greater than when product
scope is endogenous, because the high-ability firm expands along the extensive margin
into products where it has less expertise and so is less productive.21
The expansion of higher-ability firms along the extensive margin into lower-expertise
products has a variety of general equilibrium implications. The most basic of these
implications arises from the expansion of labor demand at higher-ability firms, which
bids up factor prices and so reduces the profitability of lower-ability firms. As a result,
the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability below which firms exit is higher when product scope is
endogenous than when all firms manufacture the same exogenous range of products. A
more subtle implication is for the economy’s response to changes in model parameters
such as the sunk cost of entry. The potential to respond along a new margin — the
number of goods produced — dampens responses along existing adjustment margins such
as the range of productivities where firms produce.
Proposition 3 Endogenous adjustments along firms’ extensive margins dampen the re-
sponse of the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability ϕ∗ to changes in the sunk cost of entry fe.
Proof. See appendix.
Following a rise in the sunk entry cost, the expected value of entry must rise in order
for the free entry condition to continue to be satisfied in equilibrium. When product
scope is exogenous, all of the adjustment in the expected value of entry occurs through
a fall in the zero-profit cutoﬀ below which firms exit, which expands the range of viable
19Although the proposition focuses on the weighted-average productivity of firms, a directly analogous
result holds for the unweighted average productivity of firms.
20As long as the cumulative distribution function for product expertise is continuous, the measure
of products added as ability rises is small relative to the measure of products already manufactured.
Therefore, as shown formally in the proof of Proposition 2, the reduction in firm weighted-average
productivity from expanding into lower expertise products cannot outweigh the increase caused by
enhanced productivity in existing products, which implies that firm weighted-average productivity is
monotonically increasing in ability.
21See De Loecker (2006) for an empirical analysis of productivity measurement with multi-product
firms.
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firm abilities. In contrast, when product scope is endogenous, some of the adjustment
in the expected value of entry occurs through an expansion in the range of products
manufactured by firms, thereby dampening the necessary adjustment in the zero-profit
cutoﬀ ability.
Intuitively, as the sunk entry cost rises, entry declines and product market competi-
tion is diminished. With less competition, firms are able to derive positive profits from
products which were not previously viable, and so expand their product scope, which
increases the expected value of entry. Less competition also enables lower-ability firms
who were not previously viable to make positive profits, and so the zero-profit-cutoﬀ
ability falls, which also increases the expected value of entry. But the zero-profit-cutoﬀ
ability falls by a less than it would if product scope were exogenous, because of the
increase in labor demand created by firms’ extensive margin expansion. This increase in
labor demand bids up wages, and so reduces the profitability of low-ability firms, which
leads to a smaller reduction in the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability compared to when product
scope is exogenous.
6. Open Economy
In this section, we examine the implications of opening to trade within a framework
of two symmetric countries, deferring asymmetry and the influence of comparative ad-
vantage to Section 9. We denote domestic market variables with a superscript d and
export market variables with a superscript x. In line with a large body of empirical evi-
dence, we assume that trade is costly. There are fixed costs of operating across national
borders, such as the costs of mastering customs procedures and building distribution net-
works. Therefore we assume that, to begin exporting, a firm must incur additional fixed
headquarters costs of fxh > 0 which raise total headquarters costs to fh+fxh. There are
also fixed costs of entering export markets that are specific to individual products, such
as costs of market research, advertising and conforming to foreign regulatory standards.
Hence we assume that, to export a particular product, a firm must incur an additional
product-specific fixed cost of fx > 0. As more products are exported, total fixed export-
ing costs rise, but average fixed exporting costs fall because the headquarters costs of
becoming an exporter are spread over a larger number of products. Finally we allow for
variable costs of trade, such as transportation costs, which take the standard “iceberg”
form where a fraction τ > 1 of a variety must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive.22
6.1. Consumption and Production
Profit maximization implies that the equilibrium price of a product variety is again a
constant mark-up over marginal cost, with export prices a constant multiple of domestic
22For evidence on the magnitude of overall trade costs, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and
Hummels (2001). For evidence on the fixed costs of exporting, see Bernard and Jensen (2004), Eaton,
Kortum and Kramatz (2005) and Roberts and Tybout (1997).
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prices due to the variable costs of trade:
pix (ϕ, λi) = τpid (ϕ, λi) = τ
1
ρ
w
ϕλi
. (25)
Given firms’ pricing rule and symmetric countries, equilibrium product revenue in the ex-
port market is proportional to revenue in the domestic market: rix (ϕ, λi) = τ1−σrid (ϕ, λi).
The combined revenue from a product depends upon whether or not it is exported:
r (ϕ, λi) =
½
rid (ϕ, λi)
(1 + τ 1−σ) rid (ϕ, λi)
if the product is not exported
if the product is exported
. (26)
Consumer love of variety and fixed production costs imply that no firm ever exports a
product without also selling it in the domestic market. Therefore, we may separate a
firm’s profit from a product into components earned from domestic sales, πid (ϕ, λi), and
export sales, πix (ϕ, λi), where we apportion the entire fixed production cost to domestic
profits and the fixed exporting cost to export profits:23
πid (ϕ, λi) =
rid (ϕ, λi)
σ
− fp, πix (ϕ, λi) =
rix (ϕ, λi)
σ
− fx. (27)
The combined profit from a product is therefore:
πi (ϕ, λi) = πid (ϕ, λi) + max {0, πix (ϕ, λi)} . (28)
6.2. Firm-Product Profitability
Given a firm’s ability (ϕ), the zero-profit condition in equation (11) determines a
cutoﬀ for product expertise, such that the firm sells a product domestically if it draws
an expertise equal to or greater than λ∗ (ϕ). Manipulating the zero-profit condition for
expertise for firms with diﬀerent abilities ϕ yields the same expressions for the equi-
librium range of products manufactured as in equations (22) and (23). However, the
zero-profit cutoﬀs for firm ability (ϕ∗) and product expertise (λ∗ (ϕ)) will diﬀer between
the closed and open economies and thus induce diﬀerences in equilibrium product scope.
Entry into export markets within products is determined in an analogous fashion.
For each firm ability ϕ, there is an exporting cutoﬀ for product expertise, i.e. the
firm exports the product if it draws an expertise equal to or greater than λ∗ix (ϕ):
rix (ϕ, λ
∗
ix (ϕ)) = σfx. (29)
Since products are identical, the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise is the same across prod-
ucts: λ∗ix (ϕ) = λ
∗
x (ϕ) for all i. As expertise is independently and identically distrib-
uted across products, the fraction of products exported by a firm with ability ϕ is
[1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))].
23This is a convenient accounting device which simplifies the exposition. Rather than comparing
revenue from exporting to the fixed cost of exporting, we could equivalently compare the sum of domestic
and export revenue to the sum of fixed production and exporting costs.
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Exporters vary in terms of their ability ϕ, and we refer to the lowest level of ability
among exporters as the exporting cutoﬀ firm ability ϕ∗x. Using equation (29) for
two exporting firms with abilities, ϕ and ϕ∗x, we obtain the following expression for the
firms’ relative exporting cutoﬀs for product expertise:
λ∗x (ϕ) =
µ
ϕ∗x
ϕ
¶
λ∗x (ϕ
∗
x) . (30)
The intuition underlying this relationship in the export market is analogous to the
intuition underlying the similar relationship in the domestic market (equation (22)). As
ability ϕ increases, firms become more productive in each product, and so have a lower
exporting cutoﬀ for product expertise. As the exporting cutoﬀ for ability ϕ∗x increases,
the average productivity of the product varieties supplied to the export market by rival
firms increases, which intensifies export market competition, and so raises the exporting
cutoﬀ for product expertise.
Since revenue in the export market is proportional to revenue in the domestic market,
there is an equilibrium relationship between the exporting and zero-profit cutoﬀs for
expertise. Combining the expression for the relative revenue of a variety in the export
and domestic markets, rix (ϕ, λi) = τ1−σrid (ϕ, λi), the zero-profit cutoﬀ condition for
expertise (11), and the exporting cutoﬀ condition for expertise (29) yields the following
relationship between the exporting and zero-profit cutoﬀs for expertise for those firms
that export:
λ∗x (ϕ) = τ
µ
fx
fp
¶ 1
σ−1
λ∗ (ϕ) . (31)
There is selection into export markets within products if the exporting cutoﬀ for
expertise lies above the zero-profit cutoﬀ: λ∗x (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ). In this case, for a given level
of ability ϕ, a firm with a suﬃciently high draw for expertise finds it profitable to export
the product, while another firm with a lower draw for expertise only sells the product in
the domestic market. Given the strong empirical evidence supporting the partitioning
of firms by export status, we focus on parameter values where self-selection into export
markets within products occurs: τσ−1fx > fp in equation (31) above.24
6.3. Firm Profitability
We noted earlier that no firm ever exports a product without also selling it in the
domestic market. For each product, we are therefore able to apportion fixed production
costs (fp) to profits from domestic sales and fixed exporting costs (fx) to profits from
export sales. Similarly, across the continuum of products, we are able to apportion fixed
24For empirical evidence on selection into export markets, see Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999, 2004),
Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), and Roberts and Tybout (1997).
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headquarters costs to firm profits from domestic sales and exporting headquarters costs
(fxh) to firm profits from export sales.25
As in the closed economy, with a unit continuum of identical products, firm profits
from domestic sales equal expected profits from domestic sales in an individual product
market minus fixed headquarters costs. The requirement that firm profits net of fixed
headquarters costs are greater than or equal to zero defines a zero-profit cutoﬀ for firm
ability ϕ∗, as in equations (14) and (15). Only firms who draw an ability equal to or
greater than ϕ∗ enter, and the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability varies between the closed and
open economy, as established below. Following a similar line of reasoning, firm profits
from export sales equal expected profits from export sales in an individual product
market minus exporting headquarters costs:
πx (ϕ) =
Z ∞
λ∗x(ϕ)
∙
rx (ϕ, λ)
σ
− fx
¸
z (λ) dλ− fxh. (32)
The lower the ability of a firm, the higher λ∗x (ϕ), and the lower the probability of
drawing a product expertise suﬃciently high to profitably export a product. Firms with
lower abilities have lower expected profits from an individual export market and export
a smaller fraction of products [1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))]. For suﬃciently low draws of ability, the
excess of revenue over fixed exporting costs in the small range of products that the firm
could profitably sell abroad falls short of the exporting headquarters cost. Therefore,
the following zero-profit condition defines an exporting cutoﬀ for ability ϕ∗x, such that
only firms who draw an ability equal to or greater than ϕ∗x export:
πx (ϕ
∗
x) = 0. (33)
When the exporting cutoﬀ lies above the zero-profit cutoﬀ for both firm-product
expertise and firm ability, namely λ∗x (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ) and ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗, there is selection into
export markets within and across firms. A firm which draws an ability between ϕ∗ and ϕ∗x
serves only the domestic market for all the products that it manufactures. Even though
such a firm draws an expertise above the exporting cutoﬀ in a fraction [1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))]
of products that it manufactures, the total export profits received across this fraction of
products are insuﬃcient to cover the exporting headquarters costs. A firm which draws
an ability above ϕ∗x does export, but manufactures a larger fraction of products than
it exports, so that [1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))] < [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]. For some of the firm’s products,
the expertise draw is high enough to cover fixed production costs for the product, but
too low given variable trade costs to cover fixed exporting costs for the product. Such
products are supplied to the domestic market but not exported. The parameter values
under which ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗ are determined below and are closely related to those discussed
above under which λ∗x (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ).
25Following the earlier discussion, we could equivalently compare the sum of firm profits from domestic
sales and export sales together to the sum of fixed headquarters costs and exporting headquarters costs.
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6.4. Free Entry
The expected value of entry is now equal to the sum of two terms: the ex ante
probability of successful entry times the average firm profits from the domestic market
conditional on entry (π¯d), plus the ex ante probability of successful entry times the prob-
ability of exporting times the average firm profits from the export market conditional on
exporting (π¯x), all discounted by the probability of firm death. The free entry condition
requires that the expected value of entry equals the sunk entry cost:
ve =
[1−G (ϕ∗)] [π¯d + χπ¯x]
δ
= fe, (34)
where the ex ante probability of successful entry is [1−G (ϕ∗)] and χ = [1−G (ϕ∗x)]
/ [1−G (ϕ∗)] denotes the probability of exporting. The expression for average firm
profits in the domestic market takes expectations over possible values for firm ability
in equation (14); similarly, the expression for average firm profits in the export market
takes expectations over possible values for firm ability in equation (32).
6.5. Goods and Labor Markets
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of firms entering
each period, Me, a constant mass of firms producing, M , a constant mass of firms
producing in each product market, Mp, as well as a constant mass of firms exporting
in each product market, Mpx. The steady-state equilibrium is also characterized by
stationary distributions of firm ability and product expertise in domestic and export
markets, which are determined by the zero-profit cutoﬀs ϕ∗ and λ∗ (ϕ) and the exporting
cutoﬀs ϕ∗x and λ
∗
x (ϕ), and are the same across products.
Using the equilibrium pricing rule (25) and the symmetry of the two countries, the
aggregate price index for each product may be written as a function of the mass of firms
manufacturing the product for domestic and export markets, as well as the prices of
products with weighted averages of firm ability and product expertise in the domestic
and export markets:
P =
"
Mp
µ
1
ρϕ˜
¶1−σ
+Mpx
µ
τ
ρϕ˜x
¶1−σ# 11−σ
(35)
where the weighted averages ϕ˜ and ϕ˜x depend on the ex post distributions of firm ability
and product expertise and are defined in the appendix.
Of the mass of firms with a particular ability ϕ, a fraction [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))] serve the
domestic market in a product, while a fraction [1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))] serve the export market in
a product. Therefore, the expression for the mass of firms supplying the domestic market
in a product remains as in equation (19) for the closed economy, while the expression
for the mass of firms supplying the export market in a product is analogous:
Mx =
∙Z ∞
ϕ∗x
[1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))]
µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗x)
¶
dϕ
¸
M. (36)
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With a constant mass of firms producing in steady-state, the steady-state stability
condition remains as before in equation (20). Finally, labor market clearing requires
that the demand for labor in production for the domestic market, in production for the
export market and in entry equals the economy’s aggregate supply of labor.
7. Open Economy Equilibrium
The open economy equilibrium is completely referenced by the sextuple {ϕ∗, ϕ∗x,
λ∗ (ϕ∗), λ∗x (ϕ
∗
x), P , R}. All other endogenous variables can be written as functions of
these six elements of the equilibrium vector.
7.1. Multi-Product Exporters
The range of products manufactured by a firm in the open economy is governed by
equations (22) and (23) as in the closed economy. We determine the range of products
exported in a similar way. To determine the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise for the lowest
ability exporter, λ∗ix (ϕ
∗
x), we combine the requirement that zero profits are made from
export sales by a firm with ability ϕ∗x in equation (33) with the expression for firm profits
from export sales in equation (32). We substitute for product revenue from export
sales using the relationship between relative variety revenues in equation (10) and the
exporting cutoﬀ condition for expertise in equation (29). Together these equations yield
the following expression that implicitly defines a unique value of λ∗ix (ϕ
∗
x) as a function
of model parameters alone:Z ∞
λ∗x(ϕ∗x)
"µ
λ
λ∗x (ϕ∗x)
¶σ−1
− 1
#
fxz (λ) dλ = fxh, ⇒ λ∗x (ϕ∗x) = λx. (37)
Once λ∗x (ϕ
∗
x) is known, the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise for an exporter with an
ability greater than ϕ∗x can be determined from equation (30) as a function of the firm’s
ability ϕ and the exporting cutoﬀ ability ϕ∗x: λ
∗
x (ϕ) = (ϕ
∗
x/ϕ) λ¯x. Since the exporting
cutoﬀ for expertise determines the fraction of products that a firm exports (which equals
[1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))]), equations (30) and (37) together determine the equilibrium range of
products exported for each value of firm ability.
The comparative statics of the range of products exported parallel those of the range
of products manufactured. An increase in the fixed exporting cost for a product (fx)
or the elasticity of substitution (σ) raises the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise (λ∗x (ϕ)) for
firms of all abilities, since a higher value for expertise is required to generate suﬃcient
revenue to cover the fixed exporting cost. An increase in the exporting headquarters cost
(fhx) has the opposite eﬀect, reducing the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise (λ∗x (ϕ)) for firms
of all abilities. The third comparative static is again a property of general equilibrium.
As the exporting headquarters cost rises, the total ex post profits of exporting firms
decline, thereby reducing the expected value of entry, depressing entry, and diminishing
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product market competition. As product market competition declines, firms with lower
expertise draws can generate suﬃcient profits to cover fixed exporting costs, and so the
exporting cutoﬀ for expertise falls.
The ranges of products exported and manufactured are linked in general equilibrium.
From the exporting cutoﬀ condition for expertise (29) for a firm with ability ϕ∗x, the zero-
profit cutoﬀ condition for expertise (11) for a firm with ability ϕ∗, the expression for
relative revenue in the domestic and export markets, and the equation for relative variety
revenues in (10), the exporting cutoﬀ ability ϕ∗x and the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability ϕ∗ are
related as follows:
ϕ∗x = Γϕ
∗, Γ ≡ τ
µ
fx
fp
¶ 1
σ−1
µ
λ¯
λ¯x
¶
, (38)
where we have used λ∗x (ϕ
∗
x) = λx and λ
∗ (ϕ∗) = λ.
The parameter values where ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗ (some firms export while others only serve
the domestic market) are closely related to those where λ∗x (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ) (exporters ship
some products abroad while others are only supplied to the domestic market). From the
discussion above, λ∗x (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ) whenever τσ−1fx > fp. From equation (38), ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗
whenever τσ−1fxλ¯
σ−1
> fpλ¯
σ−1
x , where λ¯ is determined by equation (23) and depends on
fixed production costs and fixed headquarters costs, while λ¯x is determined by equation
(37) and depends on fixed exporting costs and exporting headquarters costs. In the light
of the overwhelming evidence of selection into export markets, and since the interior
equilibrium is the most interesting one, we focus on parameter values where both sets
of inequalities are satisfied, so that ϕ∗x > ϕ
∗ and λ∗x (ϕ) > λ
∗ (ϕ).
7.2. Free Entry
Average firm revenue and average firm profits in the domestic market can be re-
written as decreasing functions of the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability (ϕ∗) and the zero-profit
cutoﬀ expertise for a firm with this ability (λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯), as in the closed economy: r¯d =
r¯d
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
and π¯d = π¯d
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
. Similarly, average firm revenue and average firm profits
in the export market can be re-written as decreasing functions of the exporting cutoﬀ
ability (ϕ∗x) and the exporting cutoﬀ expertise for a firm with this ability (λ
∗
x (ϕ
∗
x) = λ¯x):
thus r¯x = r¯x
¡
ϕ∗x, λ¯x
¢
and π¯x = π¯x
¡
ϕ∗x, λ¯x
¢
.
Substituting for average firm profits in the domestic and export markets in the free
entry condition, the requirement that the expected value of entry equals the sunk entry
cost becomes:
ve =
1
δ
Z ∞
ϕ∗
"Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
"µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
#
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ (39)
+
1
δ
Z ∞
ϕ∗x
"Z ∞
λ∗x(ϕ)
"µ
λ
λ∗x (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
#
fxz (λ) dλ− fxh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ = fe,
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which is again monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗, since λ∗ (ϕ) = (ϕ∗/ϕ) λ¯, λ∗x (ϕ) =
(ϕ∗x/ϕ) λ¯ and ϕ
∗
x = Γϕ
∗. This equation implicitly defines a unique zero-profit cutoﬀ
for firm ability ϕ∗ as a function of model parameters alone.
As in the closed economy, a rise in the fixed production cost (fp) leads to a rise in
the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability (ϕ∗), and an increase in either the fixed headquarters
cost (fh) or the sunk entry cost (fe) leads to a decrease in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for
ability. A rise in the fixed exporting cost (fx) has similar eﬀects to a rise in the fixed
production cost and an increase in the exporting headquarters cost (fxh) has analogous
eﬀects to an increase in the fixed headquarters cost (fh). The economic intuitions for
these comparative statics are analogous to those discussed with respect to the closed
economy equilibrium above.
7.3. Goods and Labor Markets
We have now solved for the zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise for a firm with ability ϕ∗
(λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯), the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise for a firm with ability ϕ∗x (λ
∗
x (ϕ
∗
x) =
λ¯x), and the zero-profit cutoﬀ ability ϕ∗ as a function of model parameters. These
three variables in turn determine the exporting cutoﬀ ability (ϕ∗x) in equation (38).
The quadruple {ϕ∗, ϕ∗x, λ¯, λ¯x} pins down the zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise (λ
∗ (ϕ))
and hence product scope, as well as the exporting cutoﬀ for expertise (λ∗x (ϕ)) and
hence export scope, for firms of all abilities. Together these variables determine the
ex post distributions of firm ability and product expertise in both domestic and export
markets. We can therefore solve for average revenue and profits in the domestic market
(r¯d = r¯d
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
and π¯d = π¯d
¡
ϕ∗, λ¯
¢
), average revenue and profit in the export market
(r¯x = r¯x
¡
ϕ∗x, λ¯x
¢
and π¯x = π¯x
¡
ϕ∗x, λ¯x
¢
), as well as average variety prices in the domestic
and export markets.
Combining the steady-state stability, free entry and labor market clearing conditions,
it can again be shown that aggregate revenue equals the economy’s aggregate supply of
labor (R = L). The mass of firms producing any product equals aggregate revenue
divided by average revenue, M = R/r¯, where we have determined both aggregate and
average revenue above. The mass of firms producing a product, Mp, and the mass of
firms exporting a product, Mpx, are constant fractions of the mass of firms producing
any product, M . These fractions depend solely on the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability (ϕ∗),
the zero-profit cutoﬀs for expertise (λ∗ (ϕ)), the exporting cutoﬀ ability (ϕ∗x) and the
exporting cutoﬀs for expertise (λ∗x (ϕ)) for which we have solved. The price index for
each product in equation (35) follows immediately from the mass of firms producing
each product,Mp, and the mass of firms exporting each product,Mpx, as well as average
variety prices in the domestic and export market for which we have already solved. This
completes the characterization of the equilibrium sextuple {ϕ∗, ϕ∗x, λ
∗ (ϕ∗), λ∗x (ϕ
∗
x), P ,
R}.
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8. Properties of the Open Economy Equilibrium
Multi-product firms’ decisions about endogenous product scope introduce an ad-
ditional adjustment margin along which economies can respond to trade liberalization.
Examination of this new adjustment margin yields a number of novel implications. Most
significantly, trade liberalization causes firms to drop marginal lower-expertise products
to “focus on their core competencies” in higher-expertise products. Since low-expertise
products are low-productivity products, this reallocation of resources within firms in-
duces firm-level productivity growth, oﬀering an intuitive micro-foundation for the idea
that international trade rationalizes firm production.26 This response contrasts with
existing models of heterogeneous firms and trade where firm productivity is fixed by
assumption and aggregate productivity growth is achieved entirely through resource re-
allocation across firms. As a result, our model provides a platform for analyzing firm as
well as industry responses to globalization.
Proposition 4 The opening of trade increases steady-state aggregate productivity through
both: (a) within-firm resource reallocation: multi-product firms drop low-productivity
products (focus on their “core competencies”), and therefore firm and aggregate weighted-
average productivity rise, (b) across-firm resource reallocation: low-productivity
firms exit and therefore aggregate weighted-average productivity rises.
Proof. See appendix.
The key to understanding these results is recognizing that opening an economy to
trade has heterogeneous eﬀects across firms depending on whether they are exporters
as well as heterogeneous eﬀects across products within firms depending on whether a
product is exported. As output of higher-expertise exported products rises, the resulting
increase in labor demand bids up wages and reduces the profitability of lower-expertise
products that are only supplied to the domestic market. As profitability declines in
these lower-expertise products, previously viable products become unprofitable and are
dropped. The zero-profit cutoﬀ for expertise λ∗ (ϕ) rises for firms of all abilities, so
that in equilibrium a firm with ability ϕ manufactures a smaller range of products
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]. Thus, the opening of trade leads to a contraction in equilibrium product
scope, as firms focus on their “core competencies” in a narrower range of higher-expertise
products.
Additional intuition for these findings can be gained from comparing the free entry
conditions in the closed and open economies (equations (24) and (39)). The opening
26Firm-level productivity corresponds to a weighted average of firm ability and firm-product expertise
(λ˜ (ϕ)), as defined in the appendix, and rises following trade liberalization. We note that the equilibrium
pricing rule implies proportionately lower prices for higher-expertise products, so that deflating revenue
by firm-product prices eliminates diﬀerences in measured productivity in variable production costs across
products. However, because there are fixed production costs for each product that are independent of
expertise, real revenue per unit of factor input is higher for the higher-expertise products of a firm.
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of trade increases the expected value of entry for a firm because of the positive ex ante
probability of drawing an ability high enough to export. As a result, there is increased
entry, which enhances product-market competition and raises the zero-profit-cutoﬀ abil-
ity ϕ∗ below which firms exit. This rise in ϕ∗ elevates the average productivity of the
varieties manufactured by competing firms, strengthens product market competition,
and so induces surviving firms to drop lower-expertise products. The product expertise
cutoﬀ λ∗ (ϕ) of a firm with a particular ability ϕ in equations (22) and (23) increases
as ϕ∗ rises, which implies that the firm manufactures a smaller fraction of products
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the opening of trade as a right-
ward shift in the schedule [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))], where ϕ∗A and ϕ∗CT in the figure denote the
zero-profit cutoﬀs for ability in the autarkic and costly trade economies, respectively.
Although the product expertise cutoﬀ for a firm with ability ϕ∗ remains unchanged at
λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯, the value of ϕ∗ for which the product expertise cutoﬀ is equal to λ¯ has
increased.
Figure 2: Trade Liberalization and Product Scope
The focusing on core competencies that follows the opening of trade leads to a change
in the composition of firm output that generates firm-level productivity growth. Mar-
ginally viable low-expertise products are dropped; output of all surviving products for
the domestic market contracts; and entry into exporting generates new output for the
export market of higher-expertise products. Each of these responses shifts the compo-
sition of firm output towards higher-expertise products. Therefore, even though firm
ability and product expertise are themselves parameters that are fixed by assumption,
firm productivity rises with the within-firm reallocation of resources across products.
This response contrasts with existing models of heterogeneous firms and trade in which
firms are implicitly restricted to production of just a single product.
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Our results also contrast with the predictions of an alternative framework where
products are randomly allocated to firms. In our model, each firm optimizes on the
decision of the number of products to produce, and so all firms focus on their core
competencies in higher-expertise products following trade liberalization. Whereas in the
alternative framework where firms are random groupings of products, only those firms
who happen to have products with a productivity above the old and below the new zero-
profit cutoﬀ would drop products following trade liberalization. The systematic focusing
on core competencies that occurs in our model following trade liberalization leads to
pervasive firm-level productivity growth, while the correlation between firms’ intensive
and extensive margins has additional general equilibrium implications considered further
below.
Although we have developed these results in the context of opening a closed econ-
omy to trade, similar results hold for reductions in trade costs once international trade
occurs, due, for example, to improvements in transportation technology or multilateral
trade liberalization. The proof of that result, not provided to conserve space, is di-
rectly analogous to the proof of Proposition 4 and involves diﬀerentiating the free entry
condition with respect to trade costs. Trade liberalization again generates firm-level
productivity growth and induces between-firm reallocations of resources from lower to
higher-ability firms.27
The prediction that trade liberalization leads to firm-level productivity growth is
supported by an extensive body of empirical research.28 In an influential study, Pavcnik
(2002) finds that within-plant productivity growth accounts for one third (6.6 percentage
points) of the 19 percent increase in aggregate productivity in the Chilean manufacturing
sector following the trade reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The mechanism that generates firm-level productivity growth in our model also re-
ceives empirical support. Using census data on Canadian plants, Baldwin and Gu (2006)
develop a measure of product diversification that captures the extent to which plants’
output is concentrated in their largest products. Analyzing the Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
authors find a sharp decline in product diversification following these liberalizations.
Bowen and Wiersema (2005) and Liu (2006) find a similar correlation between increased
import competition and reduced product diversification using U.S. firm-level data.
Further implications of extensive-margin adjustments emerge from the distinction
between domestic and export markets. While firms contract the range of products
that they manufacture and supply to the domestic market as trade costs fall, exporting
firms expand the range of products that they supply to the export market, so that
27Throughout the following, we focus on reductions in variable trade costs, but reductions in the
fixed costs of exporting have similar eﬀects as long as there remains selection into export markets:
λ∗x (ϕ) > λ∗ (ϕ) and ϕ∗x > ϕ∗.
28See among others Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Pavcnik (2002), Trefler (2004), Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2006), and the survey by Tybout (2003).
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exports account for an increasing fraction of firm sales. Thus, consistent with the stylized
facts presented in Section 2, there is a positive correlation between firms’ intensive and
extensive margins in both the domestic and export market.
Proposition 5 Reductions in variable trade costs (τ) lead to:
(a) exit from the domestic market by low-ability firms
(b) contraction in the domestic market along both the extensive margin (the number
of products manufactured for the domestic market) and the intensive margin (domestic
sales of each product)
(c) entry into the export market by firms who previously only served the domestic market
(d) expansion in the export market along both the extensive margin (the number of
products exported) and the intensive margin (export sales of each product).
Proof. See appendix.
The positive correlation between firms’ intensive and extensive margins magnifies
the size inequality between exporting and non-exporting firms relative to a framework
where product scope is exogenous. High-ability exporting firms are larger than low-
ability non-exporting firms, not only because they sell more of a given range of products
in the domestic market, but also because they manufacture a larger range of products,
and because they export a range of products that increases with their ability.
Proposition 6 Multi-product firms decisions about endogenous product scope magnify
the inequality in firm size between high-ability exporters and low-ability domestic pro-
ducers relative to when firms manufacture and export exogenous ranges of products
(λ∗ (ϕ) = λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯ and λ∗x (ϕ) = λ
∗
x (ϕ
∗
x) = λ¯x for all ϕ).
Proof. See appendix.
The predictions of our model are consistent with a broad set of stylized facts about ex-
porting, firm size and productivity. As in the existing theoretical literature, steady-state
firm productivity is higher at exporters than non-exporters, and there are no steady-
state diﬀerences in productivity growth across firms because productivity is drawn from
a fixed distribution. Following reductions in trade costs, all firms experience increases in
average productivity, but firms that switch from non-exporting to exporting experience
an additional source of productivity growth. New exporters not only drop lower-expertise
products, but also expand output of newly exported products, which shifts the composi-
tion of firm output towards higher-expertise products. This prediction is consistent with
a number of empirical studies that find significant productivity increases in the year of
transition to exporting (for example Bernard and Jensen 1999).
For continuing exporters, the implications of reductions in trade costs for produc-
tivity are more subtle. Continuing exporters experience productivity growth from the
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expansion of output at previously exported products, which shifts the composition of
output towards higher-expertise products. But continuing exporters also begin to ex-
port lower-expertise products, which reduces average productivity in the export market.
Combining these two eﬀects, it is ambiguous whether reductions in trade costs lead to
higher or lower productivity growth at continuing exporters than at non-exporting firms,
whose sole source of productivity growth is the reallocation of output across products
in the domestic market.
In contrast, the eﬀect of reductions in trade costs on the relative output growth
of continuing exporters and non-exporters is unambiguous. From Proposition 6, the
output of continuing exporters rises relative to non-exporters as a result of expansion
along both the intensive and extensive margin in export markets. This combination
of predictions for output and productivity is consistent with empirical findings for the
United States that, over a period since the early 1970s during which trade costs have
fallen, there is evidence of significant diﬀerences in output and employment growth
between continuing exporters and non-exporters in the same industry, but no evidence
of significant diﬀerences in productivity growth (see Bernard and Jensen 1999).
More generally, our framework features a richer and more realistic range of export
behavior than in existing models of heterogeneous firms and trade with single-product
firms. There is selection into export markets across firms (exporters and non-exporters),
within products (some firms export a product while other firms only supply the product
to the domestic market) and also within firms (some products are exported by a firm
while other products are only sold domestically). This richer range of export behavior
enables our model to better account for a number of features of the micro data on the
trade exposure of firms and plants. In particular, the model is able to explain the positive
correlation between exports per product and the number of products exported in Table
2 above. We are also able to account for empirical findings that exports comprise a
small share of revenue for many exporters, while for other firms exports constitute a
large share of revenue.29 In our framework, the share of exports in firm revenue varies
endogenously across exporters according to their ability. Higher-ability firms export a
higher fraction of products and thus have higher export shares.30
The expansion of multi-product firms along the extensive margin of the number
of products exported helps to explain the extreme inequality that is observed in the
distribution of export shipments across firms. The top 1 percent of firms are found by
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) to account for over 80 percent of the value of U.S.
29For empirical evidence on the distribution of firm export shares, see Bernard and Jensen (1995),
Bernard et al. (2003) and Brooks (2006).
30Another complementary explanation for variation in export shares involves single-product firms and
fixed exporting costs that are specific to individual export markets, so that only higher-productivity
firms find it profitable to serve destinations with higher fixed exporting costs (see for example Eaton,
Kortum and Kramarz 2005). While this alternative explanation accounts for variation in the share of
exports in firm revenue, it does not explain the positive correlation between exports per product and
the number of products exported by a firm.
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exports in the year 2000. To explain this inequality in export shipments, models of
heterogeneous firms and trade with single products require either an extremely unequal
productivity distribution and/or a high elasticity of substitution. In our framework,
higher ability increases firm export shipments through both greater exports per product
and a larger range of products exported. Therefore, the observed inequality in export
shipments can be explained with less inequality in firm ability then when product scope
is exogenous, mirroring our earlier result for the domestic market in the closed economy.
9. Multi-Product Firms and Comparative Advantage
In this section we examine the interaction of endogenous product choice and com-
parative advantage by embedding our model within the two-factor, two-country and
two-industry heterogeneous firm framework of Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006a).
The model described thus far can be viewed as capturing a single industry containing
many products, with firms supplying diﬀerentiated varieties of these products. We now
generalize the framework by analyzing two industries, j = 1, 2, each of which has this
structure. The two industries enter an upper tier of the representative consumer’s utility
that takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Υ = Uα11 U
α2
2 , α1 + α2 = 1, α1 = α, (40)
where Uj is an index for industry j that is defined over the consumptionCi of a continuum
of products i within the industry (as in equation (4)), and Ci is itself an index that is
defined over the consumption ci (ω) of a continuum of varieties ω within each product
(as in equation (5)). “Industries” now constitute an upper tier of utility, “products”
form an intermediate tier and “varieties” occupy a lower tier. We assume for simplicity
that the two industries have the same elasticity of substitution across products within
industries (κ) and across varieties within products (σ).
The industries diﬀer in the intensity with which they use two factors of production:
skilled and unskilled labor. To enter an industry, a firm from the competitive fringe must
incur the sunk entry cost for that industry, which equals fej (wS)
βj (wL)1−βj , where wS
denotes the skilled wage, wL corresponds to the unskilled wage and βj parameterizes
industry factor intensity. After the sunk entry cost is paid, the firm draws its ability
and values of product expertise for the industry that it enters as above. The distribu-
tions of firm ability and product expertise are identically and independently distributed
across industries, so that information about productivity within an industry can only
be obtained by incurring the sunk entry cost for that industry. The distributions of firm
ability and product expertise are also identically and independently distributed across
countries, which ensures consistency with the Heckscher-Ohlin model’s assumption of
common technologies across countries.
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The technology for production has the same factor intensity as for entry.31 While the
factor intensity of production varies across industries, all products within an industry are
modelled symmetrically and therefore have the same factor intensity.32 To manufacture
a variety of a product, a firm must incur a fixed and variable cost of production as above.
The variable cost depends upon the firm’s productivity in manufacturing the product,
which is again determined by both the firm’s ability and its expertise in that product.
Fixed and variable costs use the two factors of production with the same proportions,
so that the total cost of production for a firm in industry j is as follows:
Ψj =
Ã
fhj +
Z 1
0
Iji
"
fpj +
qj
¡
ϕj, λji
¢
ϕjλji
#
di
!
(wS)
βj (wL)
1−βj , 1 > β1 > β2 > 0,(41)
where Iji is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm in industry j manufactures
product i and zero otherwise. The fixed costs of becoming an exporter and of exporting
a particular product are modelled analogously, and use skilled and unskilled labor with
the same factor intensity as production and entry.
We assume that industry 1 is skill-intensive relative to industry 2 and that the home
country is skill-abundant relative to the foreign country. The combination of industry-
level variation in factor intensity and country-level variation in factor abundance gives
rise to endowment-driven comparative advantage. The skilled wage in the home country
is chosen as the numeraire.
We determine general equilibrium using an approach very similar to that of the
previous sections and therefore omit the reporting of similar equations here to conserve
space. The range of products manufactured and exported by a firm with a particular
ability can be determined using expressions analogous to those above. Similarly, the
zero-profit cutoﬀ and exporting cutoﬀ for ability can be determined following the same
line of reasoning as previously. Entry, production and exporting costs all have the same
factor intensity, and therefore terms in factor prices cancel from the relevant expressions.
There is however an important general equilibrium interaction between comparative
advantage and firms’ product scope and entry decisions. Because countries are no longer
symmetric, comparative advantage and trade costs generate cross-country diﬀerences in
industry price indices. As in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006a), these diﬀerences,
in turn, generate greater export opportunities in comparative-advantage industries than
comparative disadvantage industries.
The relative price indices for the two industries vary across countries because of the
combination of comparative-advantage-based specialization and trade costs. Special-
ization leads to a larger mass of domestic firms relative to foreign firms in a country’s
31Allowing factor intensity diﬀerences between entry and production introduces additional interac-
tions with comparative advantage as discussed in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006a).
32The symmetry of products within industries is clearly a simplification, but is useful for the law of
large numbers results that determine the fraction of products manufactured by a firm with a particular
ability.
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comparative-advantage industry than in its comparative disadvantage industry. Variable
trade costs introduce a wedge between domestic and export prices for a variety. Addi-
tionally, the fixed costs of becoming an exporter imply that not all firms export, and the
fixed costs for exporting individual products imply that only a subset of the products
manufactured by an exporter are shipped abroad. Combining specialization and trade
costs, the comparative-advantage industry has a greater mass of lower-priced domestic
varieties relative to the mass of higher-price foreign varieties than the comparative dis-
advantage industry. As a result, the price index in the domestic market is lower relative
to the price index in the export market in the comparative-advantage industry. Hence,
the degree of competition in the domestic market is higher relative to the degree of com-
petition in the export market in the comparative-advantage industry. These diﬀerences
in the degree of competition in turn imply that variable profits in the export market are
greater relative to variable profits in the domestic market in the comparative-advantage
industry than in the comparative disadvantage industry.
Proposition 7 Other things equal, the opening of trade leads to:
(a) greater focusing on core competencies and greater firm-level productivity growth in
the comparative-advantage industry than the comparative disadvantage industry (∆λ∗H1 (ϕ) >
∆λ∗H2 (ϕ) and ∆λ
∗F
2 (ϕ) > ∆λ
∗F
1 (ϕ)),
(b) a larger increase in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability below which firms exit in the
comparative-advantage industry than the comparative disadvantage industry (∆ϕ∗H1 >
∆ϕ∗H2 and ∆ϕ
∗F
2 > ∆ϕ
∗F
1 ),
(c) a larger increase in weighted-average productivity in the comparative-advantage in-
dustry than in the comparative disadvantage industry (∆ϕ˜∗H1 > ∆ϕ˜
∗H
2 and ∆ϕ˜
∗F
2 >
∆ϕ˜∗F1 ).
Proof. See Appendix.
Following the opening of trade, countries specialize according to comparative advan-
tage, which leads to a rise in the mass of firms in the comparative-advantage industry
relative to the comparative disadvantage industry. While the comparative-advantage
industry expands and the comparative disadvantage industry contracts, the shedding
of low productivity products (i.e., the focus on “core competencies”) is greater in the
comparative-advantage industry. The opening of trade therefore leads to greater firm-
level productivity growth in the comparative-advantage industry. In addition to the
greater focusing on core competencies in the comparative-advantage industry, there is
also a larger rise in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability below which firms exit. Hence,
the opening of trade causes a larger increase in average industry productivity in the
comparative-advantage industry because of both stronger firm-level productivity growth
and greater across-firm reallocations of resources.
Consideration of the greater export opportunities that exist in comparative-advantage
industries is the key to understanding these results. Following the opening of trade, there
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is a larger increase in labor demand at exported products in the comparative-advantage
industry than in the comparative disadvantage industry. This larger increase in labor
demand leads to a rise in the relative price of the abundant factor, because this fac-
tor is used intensively in the comparative-advantage industry. As the relative price
of the abundant factor rises, the diﬀerence in factor intensity between the two sectors
implies that production costs in the comparative-advantage industry increase relative
to production costs in the comparative disadvantage industry. This change in relative
production costs reduces the profits derived from products that are supplied only to
the domestic market in the comparative-advantage industry relative to the comparative
disadvantage industry. The larger reduction in domestic market profits induces greater
shedding of low-productivity products and hence greater firm-level productivity growth
in the comparative-advantage industry. Similarly, the larger reduction in domestic mar-
ket profits leads to a greater rise in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for ability and hence greater
between-firm reallocations of resources in the comparative-advantage industry than in
the comparative disadvantage industry.
As a result, the interaction of comparative advantage and endogenous product se-
lection causes a number of distinctive firm-level responses to trade liberalization that
vary with comparative advantage. The measured productivity of a firm with a partic-
ular ability depends on comparative advantage because it shapes the endogenous range
of products that the firm chooses to manufacture. Significantly, multi-product firms’
endogenous extensive-margin adjustments have general equilibrium consequences. The
greater firm-level productivity growth and between-firm reallocations of resources in the
comparative-advantage industry induce Ricardian diﬀerences in average productivity
which are non-neutral across firms and industries and provide an additional source of
welfare gains from trade.
10. Conclusions
Although multi-product firms dominate world production and trade they have re-
ceived relatively little theoretical attention among international trade economists. This
paper introduces a general equilibrium model of multi-product firms that features firm-
as well as industry-level responses to trade liberalization. Though firm productivity in
each product is fixed (once drawn) by assumption, both firm- and industry-level pro-
ductivity are shown to increase with reductions in trade costs as a result of resource
reallocation within and across firms. As trade costs fall, firms drop low-productivity
products while the lowest-productivity firms exit. Our framework therefore provides a
micro-foundation for the idea that international competition rationalizes firm produc-
tion — in marked contrast to existing models of heterogeneous firms and trade where
firms manufacture a single product. Our model and its implications are supported by a
large body of stylized facts as well as more recent findings that trade integration causes
firms to increasingly concentrate production in their most successful products.
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The model provides intuition for a number of distinctive and often surprising pre-
dictions, including the result that firms intensive (the quantity of each product is pro-
duced) and extensive (the number of products) margins exhibit a positive correlation.
During trade liberalization, exporting firms concomitantly expand the range of products
supplied to the export market and contract the range of products they manufacture.
Endogenous product scope magnifies inequality in the firm-size distribution but reduces
dispersion in average firm productivity. The adjustments of firms along their extensive
margins dampen the response of overall firm entry and exit decisions to changes in model
parameters.
Although we model endogenous product scope in general equilibrium, the framework
is highly tractable and amenable to numerous extensions. One which we include in the
paper considers the influence of comparative advantage. Another might include allowing
for several stages of production so that firms can supply multiple intermediate and final
goods. A further extension might include introducing a continuum of export destinations
to which each product can be exported. If there are fixed costs of exporting to individual
destinations and these fixed costs vary across destinations, high-firm ability firms not
only export a wider range of products, but also supply each product to a larger number
of destinations. Such an extension would further enrich the dimensions of firm responses
to trade liberalization. Other extensions might include adding stochastic shocks to firm
ability and product expertise, modifying the model to introduce strategic interaction,
and considering asymmetric trade liberalizations.
While our framework is necessarily an abstraction, the introduction of endogenous
product scope to a heterogeneous firm model with entry and exit represents an important
step towards greater understanding of multiple-product firms and their responses to
trade liberalization in general equilibrium. Testing the implications of our framework
will provide direction for further modeling of firms and trade.
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A Data Appendix33
The empirical results employ two data sources. For results on firm output, output
per product and product count, we use the data from Bernard, Redding and Schott
(2006b). Those data are derived from the U.S. Census of Manufactures of the Longitu-
dinal Research Database (LRD) maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. Manufacturing
Censuses are conducted every five years and we examine data from 1972 to 1997. The
sampling unit for each Census is a manufacturing “establishment”, or plant, and the
sampling frame in each Census year includes information on the mix of products pro-
duced by the plant. Very small manufacturing plants (referred to as Administrative
Records) are excluded from the analysis unless otherwise noted because data on their
mix of products are unavailable. Because product-mix decisions are made at the level
of the firm, we aggregate the LRD to that level for our analysis.
33The description here draws upon that in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b).
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Our definition of “product” is based upon 1987 Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) categories, which segment manufacturing output generally according to its end
use.34 We refer to five-digit SIC categories as products or goods. In the LRD, aggregate
manufacturing contains 1848 products. For each firm in each Census year, we record
the set of products in which the firm produces. We also observe firms’ total and product-
level output. There are an average of 141,561 surviving firms in each Census year for
which such extensive-margin adjustments can be observed. For further details about
the construction of the dataset, see Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b).
For export value, exports per product and the count of exported products we use the
Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD) from Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2005) which links individual trade transactions to firms in the United States.
This dataset has two components. The first, foreign trade data assembled by the U.S.
Census Bureau and the U.S. Customs Bureau, captures all U.S. international trade
transactions between 1993 and 2000 inclusive. For each flow of goods across a U.S.
border, this dataset records the product classification and the value. Products in the
LFTTD are tracked according to ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) categories, which
break exported goods into 8572 products. The second component of the LFTTD is the
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which records an-
nual employment and survival information for most U.S. establishments.35 Employment
information for each establishment is collected in March of every year and we aggregate
the establishment data up to the level of the firm. Matching the annual information in
the LBD to the transaction-level trade data yields the LFTTD. For further details about
the construction of the dataset, see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005).
B Theory Appendix
B1. Weighted Average Productivity
Aggregate weighted-average productivity is:
ϕ˜ ≡
∙
1
1−G (ϕ∗)
Z ∞
ϕ∗
λ˜ (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ
¸ 1
σ−1
, (42)
where λ˜ (ϕ) denotes weighted-average productivity for a firm of ability ϕ:
λ˜ (ϕ) =
1
1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))
Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
(ϕλ)σ−1 z (λ) dλ. (43)
34The SIC classification scheme was revised substantially in 1977 and again in 1987. Industry
identifiers from Censuses prior to 1987 have been concorded to the 1987 scheme. Our results are not
sensitive to this concordance: we get substantially similar results if we focus exclusively on the 1987 to
1997 portion of the LRD.
35This dataset excludes the U.S. Postal Service and firms in agriculture, forestry and fishing, railroads,
education, public administration and several smaller sectors. See Jarmin and Miranda (2002) for an
extensive discussion of the LBD and its construction.
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Similarly, aggregate weighted-average productivity in the export market is:
ϕ˜x ≡
∙
1
1−G (ϕ∗x)
Z ∞
ϕ∗x
λ˜x (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ
¸ 1
σ−1
, (44)
where λ˜x (ϕ) denotes weighted-average productivity in the export market for a firm of
ability ϕ:
λ˜x (ϕ) =
1
1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))
Z ∞
λ∗x(ϕ)
(ϕλ)σ−1 z (λ) . (45)
B2. Closed Economy Average Firm Revenue and Profit
Combining equations (17), (10), (11), (22) and (23), average revenue and profits can
be re-written as:
r¯ =
Z ∞
ϕ∗
"Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ)
¶σ−1
σfpz (λ) dλ
#µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗)
¶
dϕ (46)
π¯ =
Z ∞
ϕ∗
"Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
"µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
#
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗)
¶
dϕ.
where λ∗ (ϕ) = (ϕ∗/ϕ) λ¯.
B3. Open Economy Average Firm Revenue and Profit
Combining equations (17), (10), (11), (22) and (23), the expression for average rev-
enue and profits in the domestic market are the same as those in equation (46). Combin-
ing equations (32), (10), (29), (30) and (37), average revenue and profits in the export
market can be re-written as:
r¯x =
Z ∞
ϕ∗x
"Z ∞
λ∗x(ϕ)
µ
λ
λ∗x (ϕ)
¶σ−1
σfxz (λ) dλ
#µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗x)
¶
dϕ (47)
π¯x =
Z ∞
ϕ∗x
"Z ∞
λ∗x(ϕ)
"µ
λ
λ∗x (ϕ)
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− 1
#
fxz (λ) dλ− fxh
#µ
g (ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗x)
¶
dϕ.
where λ∗x (ϕ) = (ϕ
∗
x/ϕ) λ¯x.
B4. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The relative revenue of two firms with abilities ϕ00 and ϕ0 and expertises λ00
and λ0 within a product market is: IM ≡ r (ϕ00, λ00) /r (ϕ0, λ0) = (ϕ00/ϕ0)σ−1 (λ00/λ0)σ−1,
where λ is independently distributed across firms and products. The relative fraction of
products manufactured by the two firms is: EM ≡ [1− Z(λ∗ (ϕ00))] / [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ0))].
Note that λ∗ (ϕ) in equations (22) and (23) is monotonically decreasing in ϕ, while
Z (λ∗ (ϕ)) is a cumulative distribution function which is monotonically increasing in its
argument. It follows that IM and EM are both monotonically increasing in (ϕ00/ϕ0)
and are positively correlated.
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B5. Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Consider two firms with abilities ϕ00 and ϕ0, where ϕ00 > ϕ0. Combining the
equation for firm revenue in (13), the relationship between variety revenues in (10), the
zero-profit cutoﬀ for product expertise in (11), and the relationship between product
zero-profit cutoﬀs in (22) yields the following expression for the relative revenues of the
two firms:
r (ϕ00) =
µ
ϕ00
ϕ0
¶σ−1
r (ϕ0) +
Z λ∗(ϕ0)
λ∗(ϕ00)
µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ0)
¶σ−1
σfpz (λ) dλ, (48)
which is strictly greater than the relative revenue of the two firms with a common
exogenous product scope: r (ϕ00) = (ϕ00/ϕ0)σ−1 r (ϕ0).
B6. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (a) Diﬀerentiating firm weighted average productivity λ˜ (ϕ) in equation (43),
we obtain:
dλ˜ (ϕ)
dϕ
=
µ
z (λ∗ (ϕ))
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
¶
dλ∗ (ϕ)
dϕ
µ
1
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
¶Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
(ϕλ)σ−1 z (λ) dλ| {z }
Term A < 0
+
µ
1
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
¶Z ∞
λ∗(ϕ)
(σ − 1) (λ)σ−1 (ϕ)σ−2 z (λ) dλ| {z }
Term B > 0
−
µ
z (λ∗ (ϕ))
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))]
¶µ
dλ∗ (ϕ)
dϕ
¶
(ϕλ∗ (ϕ))σ−1| {z }
Term C > 0
> 0,
where dλ∗ (ϕ) /dϕ < 0. Since z (λ) is a continuous distribution function, z (λ∗ (ϕ)) /
[1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))] is of measure zero, and so the derivative dλ˜ (ϕ) /dϕ > 0.
(b) Consider two firms with abilities ϕ00 and ϕ0, where ϕ00 > ϕ0, and so λ∗ (ϕ00) < λ∗ (ϕ0).
From the definition of firm weighted-average productivity in equation (43):
λ˜ (ϕ00) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
µ
1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ0))
1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ00))
¶
| {z }
Term A
+
µ
Z (λ∗ (ϕ0))− Z (λ∗ (ϕ00))
1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ00))
¶
| {z }
Term B
Ã
λ˜0
λ˜ (ϕ0)
!
| {z }
Term C
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
µ
ϕ00
ϕ0
¶
λ˜ (ϕ0) ,(49)
where λ˜0 ≡
1
Z (λ∗ (ϕ0))− Z (λ∗ (ϕ00))
Z λ∗(ϕ0)
λ∗(ϕ00)
(ϕλ)σ−1 z (λ) dλ < λ˜ (ϕ0) ,
and where the sum of the terms in square parenthesis in equation (49) is strictly less
than one, since Terms A and B sum to one, and Term C is strictly less than one.
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B7. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider an increase in the sunk entry cost: ∆fe > 0. Denote the value of
variables before and after the change in the sunk entry cost by the subscripts 1 and 2.
With endogenous product scope: ϕ∗1 > ϕ
∗
2 and λ
∗
1 (ϕ) > λ
∗
2 (ϕ). Taking diﬀerences in the
free entry condition (24) before and after the parameter change, we obtain:
∆ve =
1
δ
Z ∞
ϕ∗1
"Z ∞
λ∗1(ϕ)
Ãµ
λ
λ∗2 (ϕ)
¶σ−1
−
µ
λ
λ∗1 (ϕ)
¶σ−1!
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ| {z }
Term A > 0
+
1
δ
Z ∞
ϕ∗1
"Z λ∗1(ϕ)
λ∗2(ϕ)
Ãµ
λ
λ∗2 (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
!
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ| {z }
Term B > 0
+
1
δ
Z ϕ∗1
ϕ∗2
"Z ∞
λ∗2(ϕ)
Ãµ
λ
λ∗2 (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
!
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ| {z }
Term C > 0
= ∆fe.
In contrast, with exogenous product scope: ϕ∗1 > ϕ
∗
2 and λ
∗ (ϕ) = λ∗1 (ϕ). Taking
diﬀerences in the free entry condition before and after the parameter change, we obtain:
∆ve =
1
δ
Z ϕ∗1
ϕ∗2
"Z ∞
λ∗1(ϕ)
Ãµ
λ
λ∗1 (ϕ)
¶σ−1
− 1
!
fpz (λ) dλ− fh
#
g (ϕ) dϕ| {z }
Term D > 0
= ∆fe.
where Term D < Term C, since λ∗1 (ϕ) > λ
∗
2 (ϕ).
For both endogenous and exogenous product scope, we require: ∆ve = ∆fe. For a given
pair of values of ϕ∗1 and ϕ
∗
2, note that Term A > 0, Term B > 0 and Term C > Term D
> 0. Therefore, since ∆ve is monotonically increasing in ∆ϕ∗ = ϕ∗1−ϕ∗2 > 0, the change
in the zero-profit-cutoﬀ ability ∆ϕ∗ must be smaller when product scope is endogenous
than when it is exogenous.
B8. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (a) The expected value of entry for the open economy in equation (39) equals
that for the closed economy in equation (24) plus an additional positive term. Since the
expected value of entry ve is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗, the equilibrium value of ϕ∗
must be higher in the open economy than in the closed economy in order to equate ve
with the unchanged sunk entry cost. The product expertise cutoﬀ λ∗ (ϕ) = (ϕ∗/ϕ) λ¯ is
monotonically increasing in ϕ∗ and therefore rises following the opening of trade. Firm
weighted average productivity in equation (43) is monotonically increasing in λ∗ (ϕ) and
so also rises, which leads to an increase in aggregate weighted average productivity ϕ˜ in
equation (42).
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(b) From the proof of Proposition 2, firms with higher abilities ϕ have higher weighted
average productivities λ˜ (ϕ). Therefore, the increase in ϕ∗ raises aggregate weighted
average productivity ϕ˜ in equation (42), not only because each surviving firm has a
higher weighted average productivity λ˜ (ϕ), but also because of the selection of firms
with higher abilities.
B9. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. (a) From the expression for the expected value of entry ve in equation (39):
dve/dτ < 0. Therefore, since (39) is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗, dϕ∗/dτ < 0.
(b) First, we consider the extensive margin in the domestic market. From equations
(22) and (23), dλ∗ (ϕ) /dϕ∗ > 0 and so dλ∗ (ϕ) /dτ < 0. Since the fraction of products
manufactured [1− Z (λ∗ (ϕ))] is decreasing in λ∗ (ϕ), the rise in λ∗ (ϕ) following a re-
duction in τ diminishes the range of products manufactured for the domestic market.
Second, we consider the intensive margin in the domestic market. The revenue received
in the domestic market from a product with expertise λ at a firm with ability ϕ can
be written as the following decreasing function of λ∗ (ϕ): rd (ϕ, λ) = (λ/λ
∗ (ϕ))σ−1 σfp.
Therefore, since dλ∗ (ϕ) /dτ < 0, drd (ϕ, λ) /dτ > 0.
(c) Diﬀerentiating the expression for equilibrium ϕ∗x in equation (38) with respect to τ :µ
dϕ∗x
dτ
τ
ϕ∗x
¶
= 1 +
µ
dϕ∗
dτ
τ
ϕ∗
¶
, (50)
where, from (a), dϕ∗/dτ < 0.
Define Ω = ve − fe. By the implicit function theorem, dϕ∗/dτ = − (dΩ/dτ) / (dΩ/dϕ∗).
Applying the implicit function theorem and using dλ∗x (ϕ) /dτ = λ
∗
x (ϕ) /τ , dλ
∗
x (ϕ) /dϕ
∗ =
λ∗x (ϕ) /ϕ
∗, dϕ∗x/dτ = ϕ
∗
x/τ and dϕ
∗
x/dϕ
∗ = ϕ∗x/ϕ
∗, it can be shown that (dϕ∗/dτ) / (τ/ϕ∗) >
−1. Therefore, from equation (50), dϕ∗x/dτ > 0.
(d) First, we consider the extensive margin in the export market. From equations (31),
(22) and (23):µ
dλ∗x (ϕ)
dτ
τ
λ∗x (ϕ)
¶
= 1 +
µ
dϕ∗
dτ
τ
ϕ∗
¶
> 0, (51)
where we have used the result, from (c), that (dϕ∗/dτ ) / (τ/ϕ∗) > −1. Since the frac-
tion of products exported [1− Z (λ∗x (ϕ))] is decreasing in λ∗x (ϕ), the decline in λ∗x (ϕ)
following a reduction in τ expands the range of products exported.
Second, we consider the intensive margin in the export market. The revenue received in
the export market from a product with expertise λ at a firm with ability ϕ can be writ-
ten as the following decreasing function of λ∗x (ϕ): rx (ϕ, λ) = (λ/λ
∗
x (ϕ)) σfx. Therefore,
since dλ∗x (ϕ) /dτ > 0, drx (ϕ, λ) /dτ < 0.
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B10. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Consider an exporting firm of ability ϕ00 and a non-exporting firm of ability
ϕ0, where ϕ00 > ϕ0. When product scope is exogenous, λ∗ (ϕ) = λ∗ (ϕ∗) = λ¯ and
λ∗x (ϕ) = λ
∗
x (ϕ
∗
x) = λ¯x, and the relative revenue of the two firms is:
r (ϕ00) =
µ
ϕ00
ϕ0
¶σ−1
r (ϕ0) +
Z ∞
λ¯x
µ
ϕ
ϕ∗x
¶σ−1µ λ
λ¯x
¶σ−1
σfxz (λ) dλ.
When the ranges of products manufactured and exported are endogenous, the relative
revenues of the two firms may be determined by combining the equation for firm revenue
in (13), the relationship between variety revenues in (10), the expression for the zero-
profit expertise cutoﬀ in (11), the relationship between the zero-profit expertise cutoﬀs
in (22), the equation for the exporting expertise cutoﬀ in (29), and the relationship
between exporting expertise cutoﬀs in (30):
r (ϕ00) =
µ
ϕ00
ϕ0
¶σ−1
r (ϕ0) +
Z ∞
λ¯x
µ
ϕ
ϕ∗x
¶σ−1µ λ
λ¯x
¶σ−1
σfxz (λ) dλ
+
Z λ∗(ϕ0)
λ∗(ϕ00)
µ
λ
λ∗ (ϕ0)
¶σ−1
σfpz (λ) dλ+
Z λ¯x
λ∗x(ϕ00)
µ
ϕ
ϕ∗x
¶σ−1µ λ
λ¯x
¶σ−1
σfxz (λ) dλ,
which is strictly greater than the expression above.
B11. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The introduction of comparative advantage implies that countries are no longer
symmetric. Therefore, the relative revenue from a product i in the domestic and export
markets in industry j depends on price indices and aggregate revenue in the two coun-
tries: rjix
¡
ϕj, λji
¢
= τ 1−σj
¡
P Fji /P
H
ji
¢σ−1 ¡
RF/RH
¢
rjid
¡
ϕj, λji
¢
. In equilibrium, the price
indices are the same for all products within an industry and country due to symmetry:
PFji = P
F
j and P
H
ji = P
H
j for all i.
The equations determining the equilibrium range of products manufactured as a func-
tion of the zero-profit-cutoﬀ firm ability ϕ∗ (equations (22) and (23)) and the equations
determining the equilibrium range of products exported as a function of the exporting
cutoﬀ firm ability ϕ∗x (equations (30) and (37)) remain exactly as in previous sections.
These relationships only compare the relative revenue of products within a particular
market within an individual industry, and are therefore unchanged by the introduction
of country asymmetries. The additional terms in factor prices due to the introduction
of skilled and unskilled labor cancel from the left and right-hand sides of equations (23)
and (37).
The free entry condition also takes the same form as previously (equation (39)), since
average profits in the domestic and export market are evaluated separately relative to
the lowest expertise product supplied by a firm in each market, and terms in factor
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prices again cancel from the left and right-hand sides of the equation.
However, the introduction of country asymmetries changes the relationship between the
exporting cutoﬀ firm ability ϕ∗xj and the zero-profit-cutoﬀ firm ability ϕ∗j , which instead
of equation (38) is given by the following expression for the home country:
ϕ∗Hxj = Γ
H
j ϕ
∗H
j , Γ
H
j ≡ τ j
µ
fxj
fpj
RH
RF
¶ 1
σ−1
Ã
PHj
P Fj
!µ
λ¯j
λ¯xj
¶
, (52)
where an analogous expression holds for the foreign country. Since λ∗xj
¡
ϕj
¢
=
¡
ϕ∗xj/ϕj
¢
λ¯xj,
the change in the relationship between ϕ∗xj and ϕ
∗
j aﬀects the exporting cutoﬀs for prod-
uct expertise λ∗xj
¡
ϕj
¢
and hence average profits from the export market in the free entry
condition (39).
Comparing the free entry conditions in the open and closed economies (equations (39)
and (24)), the expected value of entry in the open economy is equal to the value for
the closed economy plus an additional positive term which captures the expected profits
from the export market. Since λ∗xj
¡
ϕj
¢
=
¡
ϕ∗xj/ϕj
¢
λ¯xj and ϕ∗xj = Γjϕ
∗
j , this additional
positive term is larger, the smaller the value of Γj. Dividing equation (52) for the two
industries:
ϕ∗Hx1 /ϕ
∗H
1
ϕ∗Hx2 /ϕ
∗H
2
=
ΓH1
ΓH2
=
τ1
τ2
µ
fx1/fp1
fx2/fp2
¶ 1
σ−1
µ
λ¯1/λ¯x1
λ¯2/λ¯x2
¶µ
PH1 /P
H
2
PF1 /P
F
2
¶
The remainder of the proof follows the same structure as the proof of Proposition 4 in
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b) and we present an abbreviated version here. The
price index for the skill-intensive industry relative to the labor-intensive industry is lower
in the skill-abundant country than the labor-abundant country: PH1 /P
H
2 < P
F
1 /P
F
2 .
Therefore, in the absence of other diﬀerences in parameters across industries except fac-
tor intensity (common values of τ i, fh, fp, fxh, fx and fe across industries): ΓH1 < Γ
H
2
and similarly ΓF2 < Γ
F
1 . Hence, the additional positive term in the free entry condition
capturing expected profits in the export market is larger in the comparative-advantage
industry than the comparative disadvantage industry.
Noting that λ∗j (ϕ) =
¡
ϕ∗j/ϕj
¢
λ¯j, λ
∗
xj (ϕ) =
¡
ϕ∗xj/ϕj
¢
λ¯xj, and ϕ∗Hxj = Γ
H
j ϕ
∗H
j , the ex-
pected value of entry in the free entry condition (39) is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗j .
Therefore, the comparative-advantage industry’s larger increase in the expected value
of entry following the opening of trade requires a larger rise in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for
firm ability ϕ∗j in order to restore equality between the expected value of entry and the
unchanged sunk entry cost: ∆ϕ∗H1 > ∆ϕ
∗H
2 and ∆ϕ
∗F
2 > ∆ϕ
∗F
1 .
Since λ∗j (ϕ) =
¡
ϕ∗j/ϕj
¢
λ¯j, the comparative-advantage industry’s larger rise in the
zero-profit cutoﬀ for firm ability ϕ∗j implies a greater focusing on core competencies
in the comparative-advantage industry than in the comparative disadvantage industry:
∆λ∗H1 (ϕ) > ∆λ
∗H
2 (ϕ) and ∆λ
∗F
2 (ϕ) > ∆λ
∗F
1 (ϕ).
From the definition of weighted average productivity in equations (42) and (43), the
Multi-Product Firms and Trade Liberalization 52
comparative-advantage industry’s larger rise in the zero-profit cutoﬀ for firm ability and
greater focusing on core competencies implies a larger increase in weighted average pro-
ductivity in the comparative-advantage industry than in the comparative disadvantage
industry: ∆ϕ˜H1 > ∆ϕ˜
H
2 and ∆ϕ˜
F
2 > ∆ϕ˜
F
1 .
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